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NOTES
REvIw OF ECCLESIASTICAL DECISIONS BY THE CIVIL COURTS*
IN ORDER to eliminate the racketeering which had infested New York
City's kosher poultry trade, largely through its related labor unions, and
to prevent the sale as kosher of poultry slaughtered in violation of the Jewish
dietary laws, a Beth Din or religious court of twenty-three members, spe-
cially constituted after a series of conferences both lay and clerical initiated
by the Mayor of New York, issued an issur or religious edict prohibiting
orthodox Jews from consuming poultry not bearing a plombc or seal as
token of kashrutlh.3 The issur was adopted by the United Rabbinate, a
loosely organized assembly of the orthodox rabbis of Greater New York,
and subsequently accepted by the schochltin's 4 union. Its enforcement was
placed in the hands of the Kashruth Association of Greater New York, a
membership corporation of clergy and laymen. A Bronx poultry corpora-
tion, which had entered into a supervisory contract with the Kashruth
Association, brought suit against the association to rescind its contract and
to enjoin an alleged conspiracy among the association, the schochthWs union
and a large group of rabbis to libel it by advertising that its poultry was
non-kosher. The plaintiff contended that the issur was so improperly pro-
mulgated and enforced as to be void, and that its provisions were, therefore,
not proper criteria of kashruth. The Supreme Court of New "York dis-
missed the suit on the ground that the interpretation of ecclesiastical doctrine
should be left to the religious bodies and that, in the absence of fraud or
gross procedural irregularity, the courts "will only inquire whether the
organization's officer or tribunal has the power to act, not whether he or
it is acting rightly"' 5 On the authority of this case the court in a subse-
quent suit denied a motion for a temporary injunction to restrain the same
defendant from picketing and conspiring to conduct a secondary boycott
*S. S. & B. Live Poultry Corp. v. Kashruth Ass'n of Greater Nevr York, 153 Mice.
353, 285 N. Y. Supp. 879 (Sup. Ct. 1936).
1. See Feinstein, Racketeering in the A. F. of L. I. The Poultry Rachet (Sept.
11, 1935) 141 NATioir 288.
2. For outlines of Jewish court organization see HYXzoa, Tnu MAM insTrru rons
OF JEwisH LAw (1936) 13-20; MENDELSOHx, TuE CnmrmThAL JurisrnutmicE oF =
ANCIENT HEBRES (1891) 87-102; SHOHEr, THE JEWISH COURT IN TE MImD Ams
(1931) 149-159.
3. Noun corresponding to the adjective "kosher."
4. Ritual slaughterers; singular, schochet.
5. S. S. & B. Live Poultry Corp. v. Kashruth Ass'n of Greater New York, 153
fisc. 358, 366, 285 N. Y. Supp. 8Y9, 890 (Sup. Ct 1936). According to information
received from counsel by the YALE LAw JouD.I;AL no appeal will be taken. An ordinance
incorporating the requirement of supervision by the Kashruth Association is now being
considered by the Board of Aldermen of New York City. N. Y. Times, Dec. 11, 1936,
p. 8, col. 4.
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against a retail butcher shop which sold poultry slaughtered by the plaintiff
in the principal case.6
Although a few courts have insisted that Church relationship rests upon
an altogether "higher plani" than "connection with mere human associa-
tions for profit, pleasure, or culture,"7 the jurisdiction of the various eccle-
siastical courts in this country is said to be primarily contractual.8 What-
ever binding effect its exercise may have is attributed to the fact that every
member of the Church impliedly or expressly agrees upon joining it to
abide by the regulations embodied in its canons and usages, which usually
provide for some tribunal to decide all matters of Church polity.9 The basis
-of the jurisdiction of ecclesiastical courts is, therefore, comparable to that
of the tribunals of other voluntary, non-profit associations."
In either case there are two prerequisites to review by the civil courts."'
The dispute must involve what is vaguely termed a "civil or property right,'1 "
6. Schipper Public Market Corp. v. Kashruth Assn. of Greater New York,
N. Y. L. J., April 2, 1936, p. 1666, col. 5 (Sup. Ct.)."7. See Nance v. Busby, 91 Tenn. 303, 324, 18 S.W. 874, 879 (1892); Minton v.
Leavell, 297 S.W. 615, 622 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927).
8. See Thomas v. Lewis, 224 Ky. 307, 311, 6 S.W. (2d) 255, 257 (1928); Bear
v. Heasley, 98 Mich. 279, 307, 57 N.W. 270, 280 (1893); Trustees of East Norway,
etc., Church v. Halvorson, 42 Minn. 503, 508, 44 N. W. 663, 665 (1890); Everett v.
trustees of First Presbyterian Church, etc., 53 N. J. Eq. 500, 507, 32 Atl. 747, 749
(Ch. 1895). But see Chafee, The Internal Affairs. of Associations not for Profit (1930)
43 Haav. L. Rav. 993, 1001-1007. There was a .quasi-established Church in parts of
New England for some time after the Revolution. See TuE GENERAL LAWs AND
LIBERTIES OF THE MAssIACTu5sETTs COLONY (1672) 43-46 in Wmraton, TnE COLONIAL
LAws OF MAssAcHusETTs (1890); Inhabitants of Alna v. Plummer, 3 Me. 88, 91
(1824); Dillingham v. Snow, 5 Mass. *547, *553 (1809); Holt v. Downs, 58 N. H.
170, 180 (1877).
9. See Sampsell v. Escher, 11 Ohio Dec. Reprint 351, 353 (C. P. 1891).
10. Lawson v. Hewell, 118 Cal. 613, 50 Pac. 763 (1897) (fraternal order);
Belton v. Hatch, 109 N. Y. 593, 17 N. E. 225 (1888) (stock exchange) ; Robinson v,
Dahm, 94 Misc. 729, 159 N. Y. Supp. 1053 (Sup. Ct. 1916) (labor union); WmonT-
INGTON, UNINcORPORATED ASSOCIATIONS AND BUSINESS TRUSTS (2d ed. 1923) 310.
Church tribunals have also been compared to standing arbitrators. See Sanders v.
Baggerly, 96 Ark. 117, 135, 131 S.W. 49, 56 (1910); Everett v. Trustees of First
Presbyterian Church, etc., 53 N. J. Eq. 500, 507, 32 Ati. 747, 749 (Ch. 1895). For
the causes sufficient to defeat arbitration awards see SIURGES, CoMtmcRIAL ARnrraA-
TION AND AWARDS (1930) §§ 366-368. Church officials may, of course, be chosen as
common law arbitrators for non-religious disputes. Poggenburg v. Conniff, 23 Ky.
L. Rep. 2463, 67 S.W. 845 (1902); Jones v. Binns, 27 Miss. 373 (1854) ; see Payne
v. Crawford, 97 Ala. 604, 609, 11 So. 725, 727 (1892). And it has been considered
irrelevant that the arbitration was required by Church regulation. See Payne v.
Crawford, supra. Contra: Tubbs v. Lynch, 4 Harr. 521 (Del. Super. Ct. 1847). Unique
with respect to arbitration by quasi-religious tributials and under religious law is the
Jewish Court of Arbitration in New York City, chartered by the state in 1920. See
BUcHLER, COEiEN CoMEs FIRST AND OTHER CASES (1933) vii etseq.
11. On review of ecclesiastical decisions generally see ZOLHANn, AammcAw CHuRcto
LAW (rev. ed. 1933) c. 9; Comments (1926) 39 HARv. L. REV. 1079, (1927) 13 VA. L.
REv. 400; Note (1.900) 49 L. R.A. 353, 384 etseq.
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and there must have been a substantial exhaustion of the remedies within
the association with reference to which the member has "contracted."13 The
refusal of the courts to interfere in religious disputes unless the controversy
involves what the courts will call a civil or property righi is viewed as
depending not on the finality of the decision of the Church judicatory, but
on the absence of any jurisdiction whatever in the civil courts upon matters
purely ecclesiagica.' 4 Mere membership in a religious body, for example,
is frequently held to involve ho property right, so that a member who has
been expelled or suspended has no remedy in the civil courts.'0 But there
is a pronounced conflict even on this point,10 and the property requirement
generally seems to be used as a formula for enlarging the discretion of the
civil courts.'7
These prerequisites satisfied, however, the courts seem peculiarly reluctant
to interfere with the decisions of religious authorities. Review on the
"merits" is uniformly denied,' 8 even though civil or property rights are
involved, unless it is essential to the enforcement of express,'0 or in many
12. Bouldin v. Ale.x-ander, 15 Wall 131 (U. S. 1872); Gibson %. Singleton, 149
Ga. 502, 101 S.M- 178 (1919); Fussell v. Hail, 233 Ill. 73, 84 N.E. 42 (1903);
Deloisted v. Hilson, 120 Neb. 788, 235 N. IV. 340 (1931). But cf. Taylor v. Jackson,
273 Fed. 345 (App. D.C. 1921); Hatfield v. DeLong, 156 Ind. 207, 59 N.F. 483
(1901).
13. State ex rel. McNeill v. Bibb Street Church, 84 Ala. 23, 4 So. 40 (ISS3);
Crawford v. Nies, 220 Mass. 61, 107 N. F- 382 (1914); German Reformed Church
v. Commonwealth ex rel. Seibert, 3 Pa. 22 (1846). The point was ex-pressly lft
undecided in Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, 280 U. S. 1, 17 (1929).
In mutual benefit society cases provisions for appeal within the order have been held
properly ignored -when unreasonable or inadequate. See Note (1914) 52 LR.A.
(x.s.) 817, 842; Chafee, supra note 8, at 1019.
14. See Watson v. Garvin, 54 Mo. 353, 378 (1873).
15. Nance v. Busby, 91 Tenn. 303, 18 S. 'V. 874 (1892); Minton v. Leavell,
297 S. W. 615 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927), (1928). 6 Tx. L. REv. 227; see Note (1912)
36 L.R.A. (x.s.) 945; cf. Edwards v. DeVance, 138 Miss. 5SO, "103 So. 194 (1925),
(1925) 11 VA. L. REv. 648 (disputed election of deacon); Note (1912) 35 L. R. A.
(x.s.) 919 (dismissal of'clergyman). But see Comment (1923) 71 U. oF PA. L.
Rav. 161.
16. See ZoLLT&rA , op. cit. supra note 11, §§ 321, 322. There is said to be a trend
toward the abandonment of the requirement with respect to voluntary associations
generally in favor of the frank protection of interests of personality. See Chafee,
supra note 8, at 998.
17. Cf. Pound, Equitable Relief Against Defamation and Initries to Personality
(1916) 29 H~Av. L. Rv. 640, 678.
18. Mack v. Kime, 129 Ga. 1, 58 S. E. 184 (1907); Grosvenor v. United Society
of Believers, 118 Mass. 78 (1875); Borgman v. Bultema, 213 Mich. 634, 182 N. IV.
91 (1921); see Note (1900) 49 L.R.A. 353, 3M9. Contra: Smith v. Nelson, 18 Vrt.
511 (1846).
19. See Watson v. Jones, 13 Wall. 679, 723 (U. S. 1871); Hackmey v. Vrawter,
39 Ran. 615, 628, 18 Pac. 699, 703 (1888); Nance v. Busby, 91 Tenn. 303, 313, 18
S. W. 874, 876 (1892); Notes (1910) 24 L R. A. ( .s.) 692, 700, (1920) 8 A. L R.
105, 106.
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jurisdictions of implied,20 trusts for the continued observance by a congrega-
tion of the doctrines adhered to at the time of the acquisition of its property.
Judicial intervention is most likely to be secured 'on the contention that
the discipline of the Church did not authorize its tribunals to settle the
controversy at issue. The effectiveness even of this attack on the jurisdiction
of the religious court may be diminished by reason of the force still given
the decision in Watson v. Jones,2' wliere the Supreme Court of the United
States, obviously impelled by a desire to favor the northern faction in a
border state schism arising out of the Civil War, held that the civil courts
should not examine decisions of a generally ecclesiastical character 22 rendered
by religious tribunals either on their merits or for lack of jurisdiction. This
decision, however, departed from the uniform current of prior American
authority, as well as the British cases involving non-established Churches;23
and, while seldom expressly .repudiated,24 it is rarely followed outside of
the federal courts,2 and is usually distinguished. A year after the Watson
case the Supreme Court itself excepted from the operation of its rule a
case where the persons who wielded the Church authority were usurpers ;28
and the decisions of ecclesiastical courts are generally disregarded upon
proof of fraud.27 Some courts recognize merely a presumption of jurisdiction
20. Hale v. Everett, 53 N. H. 9 (1868); Kniskern v. St. John's and St. Peter's
Lutheran Churches, 1 Sandf. Ch. 439 (N. Y. Ch. 1844); Chrapko v. Kobasa, 271 Pa.
447, 114 Atl. 254 (1921), (1922) 31 YAzE L. J. 329; Peace v. First Christian Church
of McGregor, 20 T&. Civ. App. 85, 48 S. W. 534 (1898). On Church property and
change of doctrine generally see WRIGHTINGTON, Op. cit. supra note 10, § 61; ZOLtMrANN,
op. cit. supra note 11, cc. 7-8; Notes (1910) 24 L. R. A. (x. s.) 692, 703-715, (1920)
8 A. L. R. 105, 111 et seq.; (1908) 8 COL. L. PEv. 492.
21. 13 Wall. 679 (U. S. 1871). For the previous history of the dispute see
Watson v. Avery, 65 Ky. 332 (1867); Watson v. Avery, 66 Ky.' 635 (1868); cf.
Gartin v. Penick, 68 Ky. 110 (1869).
22. The civil and ecclesiastical courts may, however, have concurrent jurisdiction.
Satterlee v. United States ex rel. Williams, 20 App. D. C. 393 (1902) (minister
deposed after being found guilty by Church court of rape).
23. Long v. Bishop of Capetown, 1 Moore P. C. C. (x. s.) 411 (1863); Murray
v. Burgers, 4 id. 250 (1866). Prior American cases were in accord witb the British.
See (1871) 19 Am. L. REG. 313, 315. The courts of the Church of England, however,
occupy a position comparable to that of the inferior civil courts. See Smith v. Nelson,
18 Vt. 511, 54 (1856). On the jurisdiction of the tribunals of the Established Church
see MAKOWER, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY AND CONSTITUTION oF THE CHURCH OF
ENGLAND (1895) passim; Adams, The Writ of Prohibition to Court Christian (1936)
20 MINN. L. Rnv. 272.
24. Perry v. Wheeler, 75 Ky. 541 (1877) ; Bear v. Heasley, 98 Mich. 279, 57 N. W.
270 (1893); Watson v. Garvin, 54 Mo. 353 (1873); Landrith v. Hudgins, 121 Tenn.
556, 120 S. W. 783 (1907).
25. E.g., Brundage v. Deardorf, 92 Fed. 214 (C. C. A. 6th, 1899); Satterlee v.
United States ex rel. Williams, 20 App. D. C. 393 (1902) ; Kuns v. Robertson, 154 Il1.
394, 40 N. E. 343 (1895).
26. Bouldin v. Alexander, 15 Wall. 131 (U. S. 1872).
27. Hendryx v. People's United Church of Spokane, 42 Wash. 336, 84 Pac. 1123
(1906); cf. Hansel v. Purnell, 1 F. (2d) 266 (C. C. A. 6th, 1924), cert. denied, 266
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in the Church court,;28 and at least one has limited the Watson doctrine to
"legislative" as opposed to "judicial" determinations of religious bodies.
In effect, therefore, most courts examine ecclesiastical decisions, as they do
the decisions of other private courts, for the presence of jurisdiction in the
association's tribunals.30
Similarly, by the majority view, the civil courts render inoperative deci-
sions by ecclesiastical tribunals when the latter have failed to observe their
own organic rules of procedure.3 L This does not mean, however, that
common law rules of evidence and procedure are enforced if they are not
embodied in the canons of the Church. Religious tribunals "are not obliged
to guide themselves in the disposition of causes by Blackstone and Chitty
and Stephens. 2' 32 They are said to have the same authority as the civil
courts to adopt their own procedural rules, and they seem to be given more
latitude in this regard than the tribunals of other voluntary associations,
whose procedural rules are frequently required to satisfy standards of due
process and "fair play" with respect to notice and opportunity to be heard.3
Thus, it is no ground for attack, so long as no canon covering the point
in issue has been violated, that the accused was not allowed to challenge
his triers,34 or that the testimony was not supported by oath,35 that cross-
examination was not permitted, 30 that, as in the New York case, members
U. S. 617 (1924); Grape v. Rudisill, 101 N. J. Eq. 145, 136 At. 911 (Ch. 1927); see
Sampsell v. Escher, 11 Ohio Dec. Reprint 351, 353 (C. P. 1891).
28. Schweiker v. Husser, 146 Ill. 399, 34 N. B. 1022 (1893) ; Connitt v. Reformed
Protestant Dutch Church, etc., 54 N. Y. 551 (1874). Contra: Kerr's Appeal, 89 Pa.
97 (1879) ; see (1870) 18 Azs. L. RPu. 220, 221.
29. Philomath College v. Wyatt, 27 Ore. 390, 31 Pac. 206 (1892), relicard, 37 Pac.
1022 (Ore. 1894).
30. But Watson s,. Jones has, in a few controversies involving large amounts of
property located in several states, resulted in conflicting decisions by the respective
civil courts of last resort Compare Bear v. Heasley, 93 Mich. 279, 57 N. XV. 270 (1893),
with Brundage v. Deardorf, 92 Fed. 214 (C. C. A. 6th, 1899); compare Landrith .
Hudgins, 121 Tenn. 556, 120 S. IV. 783 (1907), with Brown v. Clark, 102 Te. 323,
116 S. XV. 360 (1909); see Patton, The Cumberland Church Cascs (1915) 64 U. oF"
PA. L. REv. 66.
31. First Church of Christ Scientist v. Rentzel, 242 Mich. 120, 213 N. IV. 652
(1928) ; Jennings v. Scarborough, 56 N. J. L. 401, 28 At. 559 (Sup. Ct. 1S94) ; Grupe
v. Rudisill, 101 X. J. Eq. 145, 136 At. 911 (Ch. 1927) ; Wallace v. Trustees of General
Assembly of United Presbyterian Church, etc., 201 Pa. 292, 50 At. 762 (1902). But
cf. Satterlee v. United States ex rel. Williams, 20 App. D. C. 393 (1902).
32. Linderholm v. Kansas Conference of Swedish Evangelical Lutheran Synod,
etc., 97 Kan. 212, 216, 155 Pac. 24, 26 (1916).
33. Cf. Comment (1936) 45 YALu L. J. 1248, 1265 et .cq. (labor unions); Note
(1900) 49 L. R. A. 353, 363-371 (benefit societies, exchanges, dubs).
34. Chase v. Cheney, 58 Ill. 509, 533 (1871).
35. MNcGuire v. Trustees of St. Patrick's Cathedral, 54 Hun 207, 221, 7 N. Y. Supp.
345, 352 (Sup. Ct 1889).
36. Ibid.; Arthur v. Norfield Parish Congregational Church Soc., 73 Conn. 718,
733, 49 Atl. 241, 247 (1901).
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of the court were witnesses as well as judges and accepted hearsay evidence,37
or even that no hearing was granted the accused and no direct notice given
him of the final determination.88
In this entire field of Church litigation there seems to be no direct prece-
dent for allowing an ecclesiastical body to control a fifty million dollar
industry,39 as the New York court did,40 and to do it so effectively that
a violation of its decree is also an infraction of ,the State's penal law; for
it is a misdemeanor in New York to offer non-kosher meat for sale as
kosher if there is an "intent to defraud." 41 The adoption of the issur seems
to have been legislative in a sense rather than judicial, more analogous, for
example, to the Index librorum prohibitorum of the Roman Catholic Church 42
than to the usual ecclesiastical trial between members of the Church or op-
posing factions within it. By the weight of authority, however, no distinction
is made between legislative and judicial determinations of ecclesiastical bodies,
notwithstanding the broader potential scope of the latter.4 3 The rule of
secular review in either case should take into account the danger and diffi-
culties of civil interference in religious affairs on the one hand 44 and the
accusation on the other that icclesiastical courts are "proverbially influenced
more by prejudice and passion than any other species of judicial tribunal.""4
The rights of persons adversely affected would seem to be sufficiently pro-
tected if, as the New York court intimated, ecclesiastical decrees are subject
to attack for lack of jurisdiction, fraud and gross irregularity of procedure.
37. S. S. & B. Live Poultry Corp. v. Kashruth Ass'n of Greater New York, 158
Misc. 358, 363, 285 N. Y. Supp. 879, 886 (Sup. Ct. 1936). But the award must have
been rendered by an independent tribunal and not. by one of the parties to the con-
troversy. Mt. Zion Baptist Church v. Whitmore, 83 Iowa 138, 152, 49 N. W. 81, 85
(1891).
38. Cohen v. Silver, 277 Mass. 230, 236, 178 N. E. 508, 510 (1931) ; Stack v. O'Hara,
98 Pa. 213, 232 (1881). But cf. Gray v. Christian Soc., 137 Mass. 329 (1884).
39. Reister, Report to Dep't of Public Markets, Weights and Measures, New York
City, The Live Poultry Industry in Greater New York, 1935, at 7. More than 80% of
the fowl sold in the metropolitan area is represented to be kosher; estimates have run
as high as 90%. Ibid.
40. Cf. Cohen v. Silver, 277 Mass. 230, 178 N. E. 508 (1931) (injunction denied
against order to schoclhim by Jewish court not to slaughter for wholesaler who violated
Jewish laws and disregarded summons of 'eligious court).
41. N. Y. PENAL LAW §§ 435-435a, constitutionality upheld, Hygrade Provision Co.
v. Sherman, 266 U. S. 497 (1925).
42. See 7 CATHOLIc ENCYCLOPAEDIA (1910) 721. Pecuniary loss sustained by the
publisher of a Polish language newspaper as a result of the circulation by several bishops
of a pastoral letter forbidding members of the Church to read or write for the paper
because of its alleged anti-Catholic spirit has been held danum absque ijuria. Kuryer
Publishing Co. v. Messmer, 162 Wis. 565, 156 N. W. 948 (1916).
43. See Auracher v. Yerger, 90 Iowa 558, 566, 58 N. W. 893, 896 (1894); Land-
rith v. Hudgins, 121 Tenn. 556, 645, 120 S. W. 783, 806 (1907). But see note 29, supra.
44. These have been aptly termed the "hot potato" and "dismal swamp" con-
siderations respectively. See Chafee, supra note 8, at 1024-1026.
45. (1871) 19 Ams. L. REG. 308, 309; see, e.g., Dees v. Moss Point Baptist Church,
17 So. I (Miss. 1895); State ex rel. Dubs v. Esher, 6 Ohio C. C. Rep. 312, aff'd, 51




IT is well settled in this country that there can be no extradition to foreign
States in the absence of a treaty or statute covering the particular case.'
Whatever power Congress may have to provide for extradition independently
of treaty has never been exercised except in relation to a foreign country or
territory "occupied by or under the control of the United States."2 The
general extradition act simply defines the procedure for carrying out an
existing extradition treaty.3 Late in the last century the issue arose whether
sufficient authority is given the executive to extradite American citizens
under treaties containing the provision that neither State "shall be bound to
deliver up" its own nationals 4 This language, in contrast with the type of
clause in the treaty with the Two Sicilies of 1855 which explicitly exempted
"citizens and subjects of each of the high contracting parties,"s would seem
prima fade to imply the reservation of a discretionary power to extradite
nationals; and it appeared in substantially the same form, without apparent
issue, in thirteen treaties between 1852, the date of the Prussian treaty in
which it originated, and 1884.0 In the latter year, however, came the first
of a series of four refusals by the Secretary of State to extradite American
citizens to Mexico or to request the extradition of Mexican citizens to the
United States under a Mexican treaty with a provision of this type.7 On the
*Valentine v. United States ex rel. Neidecker, 57 Sup. Ct. 100 (1936).
1. Ex parte Dos Santos, 7 Fed. Cas. No. 4,016 (C. C. D. Va. 135) ; ree Holmes
v. Jennison, 14 Pet. 540, 549 (U. S. 1840); Factor -. Laubenheimer, 290 U. S. 276,
287 (1933); 1 Mooan, EXTRADmT (1891) 13; 4 Moou, DiGEST OF IZITCI.ATIo.AL
LAW (1906) 245. It is no defense to prosecution in the United States, however, that
the defendant has been forcibly taken from another country, even in violation of treaty.
Ker v. Illinois, 119 U. S. 436 (1886). The power to e.tradite is exclusively national.
People ex rel. Barlow v. Curtis, 50 N. Y. 321 (1872); see Holmes v. Jennison, stpra,
at 571.
2. 31 STAT. 656 (1900), 18 U. S. C. § 652 (1934) ; see Neely v. Henkel, 190 U. S.
109, 122 (1901).
3. Rv. STAT. §5270 (1875), I U. S. C. §651 (1934).
4. For a list of such treaties see Brief for Petitioners, pp. 43-44, Valentine v.
United States ex reL. Neidecker, 57 Sup. Ct. 100 (1936). The exemption of nationals
in extradition treaties has been the subject of much discussion. See BLor, Tnu'xP
DE L'EXTmlriOx (1374) 66; 1 MooRE, ExTwwrAinoI 152; 4 Moons, Dzvj 287;
5 TRAvEts, DorT P~xnA. ImxATzoxAL, (1922) 14; Draft Conzz nion on Extradition
(1935) 29 Air. J. Ixr. L. Sump. 15, 123; Manton, Extradition of Nationals (1935)
10 TEmp. L. Q. 12. Internationally, of course, it would be unnecessary to confer dis-
.cretion by treaty; but a grant of discretionary power may be necessitated by reason of
an objection in the municipal law, in the absence of express treaty or statutory provision,
-to extradition generally (see note 1, mtpra) or to the surrender of nationals (Draft
.Conventfiom, spra, at 125).
5. 11 STAT. 653 (1855).
6. See list cited mipra note 4.
7. 1 Moons, ExTRA mox 166 et seq.; 4 Moos, DIGEST 301-302; see Ex torte
McCabe, 46 Fed. 363, 378-379 (W. D. Te,.- 1891). Under a similar treaty vth
Sweden and Norway, 12 STAT. 1126 (1860), the Swedish government twice refused.to
surrender Swedish subjects. 1 Mooms, ExTRADITIoz 169.
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basis of these executive interpretations a federal court in Texas held in 1891,
in Ex parte McCabe,3 that there could be no extradition of American citizens
under the Mexican treaty in the absence of an independent statutory grant
of discretionary power. A new treaty was thereupon signed with Mexico in
1899 which, after reciting that neither party "shall be bound to deliver up"
its own nationals, provided that "either shall have the power to deliver them
up, if, in its .discretion, it be deemed proper to do so."' , This variation, which
first appeared in the Japanese treaty of 1886,10 was repeated in five of the
nineteen extradition conventions,11 exclusive of the new Mexican treaty of
1899, negotiated between 1891, the date of the McCabe decision, and 1909.
The extradition treaty with France of 1909 followed the language of the
earlier Mexican treaty, without the proviso introduced in the Mexican treaty
of 1899.12 Finding evidence in the use of that clause of an intent to adopt the
interpretation which the State Department had given it with respect to the
earlier Mexican treaty, the Supreme Court of the United States has recently
affirmed a discharge on habeas corpus of three Americans accused of various
extraditable crimes of a financial character committed in France and held for
extradition by the respondent, the Police Commissioner of New York City,
on a warrant issued by a United States Commissioner upon request of the
Acting French Consul General. 3
In adopting the narrow construction of the State Department and of the
McCabe case, the Court had to distinguish a contrary decision of the Queen's
Bench.on a clause of an Anglo-Belgian treaty identical with that of the
French and earlier Mexican conventions:14 since, the Court said, a pro-
vision in an Anglo-Swiss treaty that "no subject of the United Kingdom
shall be delivered up" had earlier been construed as exempting British sub-
jects absolutely from the general clause providing for surrender of fugi-
tives,' 5 the change to the wording, "in no case . . . shall the high con-
tracting parties be bound to surrender their own subjects," in order to be
8. 46 Fed. 363 (W. D. Tex. 1891). Although repeated administrative interpre-
tations in this sort of case will influence the court [see National Lead Co. v. United
States, 252 U. S. 140, 145 (1920); Sullivan v. Iidd, 254 U. S. 433, 442 (1921)], the
question remains a judicial one [United States v. Rauscher, 119 U. S. 407 (1886)].
See Lenoir, Treaties and the Supreme Court (1934) 1 U. or Cu. L. REv. 602.
9. 31 STAT. 1822 (1899). Under this treaty the State Department the same
year surrendered an American citizen accused of murder in Mfexico. FoIREIG RELA-
TIONS (U. S. Dep't State 1899) 497.
10. 24 STAT. 1017 (1886).
11. Orange Free State [31 STAT. 1815 (1896)]; Argentina [31 STAT. 1886 (1896)];
Guatemala- [33 STAT. 2152 (1903)]; Nicaragua (35 STAT. 1874 (1905)]; Uruguay
[35 STAT. 2033 (1905)]. This type of clause, however, seems to have disappeared
after 1905.
12. 37 STAT. 1530 (1909).
13. Valentine v. United States ex rel. Neidecker, 57 Sup. Ct. 100 (1936), aff'g
United States ex reL Neidecker v. Valentine, 81 F. (2d) 32 (C. C. A. 2d, 1936) (Manton,
C. J., dissenting), (1936) 30 Am. J. INT. L. 480, (1936) 49 -A"v. L. Rav. 1003.
14. li re Galwey, [1896] 1 Q. B. 230.
15. Regina v. Wilson, 3 Q. B. D. 42 (1877).
given any effect at all, must have been designed to confer discretion where
before there had been a complete exemption. The history of the Mexican
treaties, too, might have supported the Court in a contrary result. Although
the first Secretary of State to rule on the earlier Mexican treaty construed
several instances in which requests by the United States for the extradition
of Mexicans had been denied as indications that the Mexican government
considered the clause to exempt nationals absolutely, those cases might
equally have been ascribed to the legitimate exercise by Mexico of her dis-
cretion under the treaty. This was the construction placed upon the attitude
of the Mexican government by the Supreme Court of that country in a
decision in 1878, seven years after the first request for extradition by the
American Secretary of State, which allowed the discretionary extradition
of two Mexicans accused of murder in Texas. 6
The explicit reservation of a discretionary power in the later Mexican
treaty, moreover, was a practical solution of a difficult problem along the
border states created as a result of the conflicting interpretations of the
earlier clause by the two countries; the situation with respect to France was
different. The first treaty with France"' had provided for the enxtradition
of all "persons" without qualification. Although this type of treaty had been
construed by the Department of State to include nationals, the French
government had consistently refused to surrender French citizens.'8 The
adoption of language in the treaty of 1909 to the effect that neither State
"shall be bound" to extradite its own citizens might have been considered
evidence of an intent to sanction the existing French practice without deny-
ing a discretion to this country consonant with the American policy of equal
surrender in cases of nationals or of aliens.' 0 A construction of this sort
would seem to be fortified by the fact that the French law permits the
punishment of French citizens for crimes committed abroad2 0 whereas the
Anglo-American system of criminal law is generally territorial.:' In view,
however, of the judicial-approval which has now been given the continued
executive practice in this country under extradition clauses of the type
contained in the French treaty, the solution would seem to lie in the adoption
of a convention with a clear provision for the extradition of nationals.
16. BExradition of Domnguez, 1 VALLARTA, CuEsrious Cousruciorr.s (1879)
39, translated, FoPEIGN REATioNs (U. S. Dep't State 1878) 562. Magistrate Ramirez
held in his concurring opinion that no constitutional authority to extradite nationals
e:dsted in the absence of treaty.
17. 8 STAT. 580 (1843).
18. 4 MooRa, DiGES T 298. This practice was without statutory authority until
1927. ThAvEas, L'Exntms REFRanssivw IN amTAoirAx. (1928) 169.
19. 4 MooRE, DIGEST 238 ef seq. Lack of reciprocity in the surrender of nationals
is no objection to the validity of a treaty, even where the treaty requires such sur-
render. Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U. S. 447 (1913).
20. CoDE D'ImSTRUCriox CRn zL (1910) art. 5.
21. See MooRE, REORT ON Ex-ATERRuOIX. C Alto Tm- CurrnG CtsE
(1887) 23; Berge, Criminal Jurisdiction and the Territorial Prindple (1931) 30 Micm
L. REv. 238; Draft Convention on Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime (1935) 29 Azr.
J. NT. L. Supp. 439, 480.
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POWER OF BANKS TO GUARANTEE THE LIABILITIES Or OTHER BANKS*
PLAINTIFF bank, induced by a group of banks which included the defendant,
agreed to assume the liabilities of, and to liquidate the X bank, then on the
verge of failure. In exchange for its assumption of liabilities, plaintiff took
from the X bank a note secured by an assignment of all its assets. Defendant
bank and its associates, in consideration of plaintiff's promise, severally
agreed to indemnify plaintiff proportionally against any losses incurred b,
its assumption of X's liabilities. This cooperative action was prompted by a
common interest in preventing the failure of X bank and the impact of that
failure upon the public confidence in the banking group. The contract betveen
the banks further provided that a committee, representing the defendant and
the other banks in the group, should be appointed to supervise and control
the liquidation carried out by the plaintiff and, if desirable, t6 conduct the
liquidation itself.' Subsequently plaintiff bank, having proceeded with the
liquidation as agreed, brought an action to recover the promised indemnity
for the losses it had realized. The defendant bank then moved to strike out
the complaint contending that its guaranty was ultra vires. The Supreme
Court of New Jersey,2 however, rejected this contention, holding in effect
that promises of guaranty or indemnity made upon such a cooperative basis
by a group of banks acting primarily for their own benefit, were intra vircs.8
The corporate powers of a bank are generally said to embrace only those
powers granted by statute, and those which a strict construction of statutes
will admit as incidental and necessary to the exercise of the enumerated
powers.4 Banks customarily are authorized to carry on the banking business
by discounting and negotiating evidences of debt; by receiving deposits; by
buying and selling exchanges, coin, and bullion; and by lending money on
security.5 A general power to make guaranties is never expressly included
in the statutory lists of powers.6 The absence of ah express grant of power,
however, has not prevented the enforcement of guaranties which the courts
*Trust Company of New Jersey v. Jefferson Trust Company, 186 At. 732 (N. 3.
Sup. Ct. 1936).
1. Ibid. Plaintiff's Brief, p. 15.
2. No appeal has yet been taken.
3. See Trust Co. of New Jersey v. Jefferson Trust Co., 186 Atl. 732, 735 (N. J.
Sup. Ct. 1936).
4. See California Bank'v. Kennedy, 167 U. S. 362, 366 (1897) ; Texas & Pac. Ry.
v. Pottorf, 291 U. S. 245, 253 (1933); Nassau Bank v. Jones, 95 N. Y. 115, 121 (1884).
Considerations of public policy have induced courts- to construe the broad words,
"incidental and necessary" more strictly where banks are concerned than in the case
of ordinary business corporations. Gardiner Trust Co. v. Augusta Trust Co., 182 Atl.
685 (Me. 1936); County of Divide v. Baird, 55 N. D. 45, 212 N. W. 236 (1927).
5. For typical instances of these statutes see 13 STAT. 101 (1864), 12 U. S. C. A.
§24 (1934) ; N. J. ComT. STAT. (Supp. 1920) tit. 17, §6; N. Y. BANKING LAw § 106(1).
6. 1 ZoLLmAN, BANKs AND BANKING (1936) §§212, 231. Banks are sometimes
granted a power to make guaranties for a limited purpose. Compare PA. STAT. ANN.




would characterize as having been entered into by banks for the furtherance
of their own rights or as an incident to the transaction of their own business.7
Under the applications of this flexible rule, it is clear that in order to protect
authorized loans, a bank may ordinarily guarantee to its debtors' other
creditors that their pre-existing or subsequently created loans will be paid.s
A bank may also guarantee the quality of its debtor's goods in order to induce
a potential purchaser of those goods to assume the debt,0 or warrant the
quality of goods in order to realize on collateral security already obtained;10
or guarantee payment of a note which is the obligation of another, if this is
necessary to dispose of ifs own paper and securities;" and the guaranty of
the liabilities of another bank, if accompanied by a receipt of assets, may
be upheld as incidental to the exercise of the power either to purchase and
discount paper and securities or to buy and sell coin and bullion.' 2 Likewise
letters of credit, though guaranties in effect,23 are generally sustained by
the courts. They may be upheld as incidental to a granted power; yet they
are conventionally approved in deference to banking practice.' 4
The power of a bank to make guaranties is dearly bolstered when the
liabilities assumed by the bank are proportionate in amount to the assets it
7. 4 MicHm, BANxs AND BAnxiNG § 33 (1931) : 7, id. § 163 (1932).
8. Allis-Chalmers Mffg. Co. v. Citizens Bank and Trust Co., 3 F. (2d) 316 (D.
Idaho, 1924); Norton Grocery Company v. Peoples National Bank, 151 Va. 195, 144
S. E. 501 (192) ; Second National Bank v. U. S. Fidelity Co., 266 Fed. 4S9 (C.C. A.
4th, 1920); Contra: Howard and Foster Co. v. Citizens National Bank, 133 S. C. 202,
130 S. E. 758 (1925); First National Bank v. Monroe, 135 Ga. 614, 69 S. M. 1123
(1911).
9. Exchange Bank v. Hensley and Roland, 240 S. NV. 679, (Tex. Civ. App., 1922).
10. Gotham National Bank v. Sharwood, 23 F. (2d) 567 (C. C. A. 2d, 19);
Taylor v. Hemphill, 238 S.W. 986 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922), [Guaranty must, however, he
a reasonably appropriate means of achieving the admittedly legitimate end].
11. International Harvester Co. v. State Bank of Upham, 38 N. D. 632, 166 N. W.
507 (1918); Collings v. Guaranty Trust Co. 10 F. Supp. 462 (D. N. J. 1935); Peoples
Bank v. Manufacturer's Bank, 101 U. S. 181 (1S79), semble.
12. Schofield v. State National Bank, 97 Fed. 282 (C. C. A. 8th, 1899).
13. Regarded functionally letters of credit are loans of credit and not loans of
funds. See McCurdy, Counercial Letters of Credit (1922) 35 H nv. L. Rcv. 539, 542.
14. Zor.mAN, BANKS AND BANKING (1936) § 5104 (linking the power to issue a
letter of credit to the power to lend money). The attempt to rationalize in those
terms the enforcement of banks' obligations under letters of credit has led to judicial
hairsplitting on the issue of primary and secondary liability. Compare Chandanmull
Benganey v. National Bank of India, 51 I.L. R. (Calc. Ser.) 43 (1923); FnmxrELSzT,
LEGALx AspEcTs or Coa-nscrAL. LTTEms or Czuvrr, (1930) 32-33, 38-39. Usage suffi-
ciently indicates the necessity of letters of credit [McCurdy, Commercial Lctters of Credit
(1922) 35 H]Rv. L. REv. 539] and tangible benefits and security to the banks which they
afford would justify their enforcement to the most sensitive proponent of depositors' rights.
McCornick & Co. v. Citizens Bank, 304 Mo. 270, 263 S. IV. 152 (1924). In many states
the power to issue letters of credit is expressly granted to banks. Typical statutes are:
OHIo G=T. CoDa (Page, 1926) §710-137; OaM. CODE Anu. (1930) §22-527(6). See
further FN L.sTznT, op. cit. supra at 5, footnote 7.
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seeks to preserve, 15 or when the guaranty is secured by the debtor's assign-
ment of assets sufficient to protect it.' If the assets are insufficient or the
relation is disproportionate, the validity of the guaranty may be questioned
even though on the single issue of the power to make it, it may be justified
as necessary and incidental to a granted power.17 Some courts have indicated
support for the contrary proposition that a guaranty which results in non-
speculative financial profit to the lending bank may be intra vires whether
or not it is incidental to usual banking business.1 8 But the language to this
effect is not clear since corporate estoppel is always available as an alterna-
tive basis of decision,'" and since in the federal courts, at least, recovery
may be had in quasi-contract to the extent of the benefit received, although
the guaranty is admitted to be ultra vires.20
There is, therefore, adequate judicial iuthority for the proposition that
when substantial, tangible benefit in the form of an assignment of assets has
been received by a bank, it may, to further its own immediate banking inter-
ests, assume the liabilities of another bank whether it is proposed to merge,
to consolidate, to liquidate the second bank, or to rehabilitate it.21 This au-
15. Merchants' Bank of Valdosta v. Baird, 160 Fed. 642 (C. C. A. 8th, 1908) (un-
limited guaranty of its debtor's future obligation held ultra vires of defendant bank);
Second National Bank -v. U. S. Fidelity Co. 266 Fed. 489 .(C. C. A. 4th, 1920).
16. Catherine Planting and Mfg. Co. v. Pointe Coupe Trust and Savings Bank,
1§0 La. 963, 107 So. 711 (1926); Talman v. Rochester City Bank, 18 Barb. Sup. Ct.
123 (1854); Mott Iron Works v. Kaiser Co., 131 S. C. 392, 103 S. E. 783 (1920) ;
Creditors Claim and Adjustment Co. v. Northwest Loan and Tust Co., 81 Wash. 247,
142 Pac. 670 (1914).
17. Merchants' Bank of Valdosta v. Baird, 160 Fed. 642 (C. C. A. 8th, 1908).
In such a case though sustainable as within the power of the bank the guaranty may
be declared void as against public policy.
18. Cf. American Surety .Co. of N. Y. v. Philippine National Bank, 245 N. Y. 116,
131, 156 N. E:. 634, 640 (1927); Gause v. Commonwealth Trust Co. 196 N. Y. 134,
89 N. E. 476 (1909) (that "benefit" received must be direct and tangible). Accord:
In re Bankers' Trust" Co., 27 F. (2d) 912 (N. D. Ga., 1928).
19. Mott Iron Works v. Kaiser Co., 131 S. C. 392, 103 S. E. 783 (1920); Central
Railroad and Banking Co. of Georgia v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co., 114 Fed. 263
(C. C. A. 5th, 1902) ; Lander State Bank v. Putnam, 40 Wyo. 312, 276 Pac. 926 (1929);
6 FLEcHaE, CYcr.oPEDA OF CoRPoRgAoNs [1931] § 2592.
A bank may be estopped to deny liability on its guaranty when the promisee hals
acted thereon to his injury. See Creditors Claim and Adjustment Co. v. Northwest Loan
and Trust Co. 81 Wash. 247, 256, 142 Pac. 670, 672 (1914). The majority rule is,
however, that estoppel will not be invoked against a bank unless it has received money
or property as a result of its undertaking. Nowell v. Equitable Trust Co. 249 Mass.
585, 144 N. E. 749 (1924); In re Steele Furniture Co. 18 F. (2d) 490 (C. C. A. 3d,
1927), cert. denied, 274 U: S. 758 (1927) (benefit must be tangible).
20. First National Bank of Aiken v. Mott Iron Works, 258 U. .S. 240 (1921);
Citizens Central National Bank v. Appleton 216 U. S. 196 (1910); Oklahoma City
National Bank v. Ezzard 58 Okla. 251, 159 Pac. 267 (1916); First National Bank v.
Monroe 135 Ga. 614, 621, 69 S. E. 1123, 1126 (1910).
21. Commercial Trust Co. of Hagerstown v. Laurens County, 267 Fed. 879 (S. D.
Ga. 1920); (consolidation) ; United States States Fidelity and Guaranty Co. v. Citizens
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thority seems fully to support the bank guaranty under the facts of the prin-
cipal case; and it should not be material that the assets of the weak bank
were assigned to one bank as agent for the defendant and its associates rather
than apportioned directly among the group of guarantors. There was, then,
no need for the court to rely on a broader rule such as that suggested, by vray
of dictum, in the New York case of O'Cowwr v. Bankers Trust Co.,2 in-
volving different facts. There the guaranty was thought valid despite the
fact that the bank did not receive tangible benefit sufficient under the tradition-
al rule 2s to estop it from denying liability, and that there was no assignment
of assets, to the purchase of which the guaranty might be sustained as in-
cidental. There are few cases discussing comparable situations and they are
in conflict 2
Any broad statement to the effect that a bank may, ostensibly to save itself
from a disastrous "run", lend its credit to insure the liabilities of another
banlrcqn makes possible indiscriminate legal approval of guaranties even though
they are unsecured and their scope is unrestricted. Such a rule might nullify
the legal safeguards of bank examination, statutory cash reserve, and re-
strictions of loans, since "overnight a banke' could, "without any addition to
its own assets, assume (without limitation) the liabilities of one or more
National Bank, 13 F. (2d) 213 (D. N. M. 1924); Schofield v. State National Bank
97 Fed. 282 (C. C. A. 8th, 1899); Nakdimen v. First National Bank, 177 Ark. 303,
6 S.W. (2d) 505 (1928) (rehabilitation); Hightower v. American National Ban!;
263 U. S. 351 (1923) (liquidation); Wyman v. Wallace, 201 U. S. 230 (1906); Wan-
namaker v. Edisto National Bank of Orangeburg, 62 F. (2d) 696 (C.C. A. 4th, 1933),
(1933) 84 A. L. R. 1425. Where assets are received the courts have not been concerned
with the precise power to which the guaranty is incidental; Southern Exchange Bank
v. First National Bank, 37 Ga. App. 612, 141 S. B. 323 (1928).
22. 289 N. Y. Supp. 252 (Sup. Ct. 1936), noted (1936) 50 HAmv. L. Rnv. 130.
23. Gause v. Commonwealth Trust Co. 196 N. Y. 134, 89 N. E. 476 (1909) ; Federal
Land Bank of St. Paul v. Crookston Trust Co., 180 Minn. 319, 230 N. W. 797 (1930).
The O'Connor case appears to broaden the estoppel rule as applied to banks to cover
cases of complete performance and action in reliance by the promisee. See O'Connor
v. Bankers' Trust Company, 289 N. Y. Supp. 252, 273 (Sup. Ct. 1936).
24. Southern Exchange Bank v. First National Bank, 37 Ga. App. 612, 141 S. B.
323 (1928) [promise by defendant bank to indemnify plaintiff bank proportionally against
liabilities assumed, held in ra vires under broad powers without regard to tangible
benefit. Defendant was also estopped by plaintiffs' performance. to deny liability.
Presence of assignment of assets and reservation of power to take them over afford
alternative ground of decision]; Board of Commissioners v. Citizens Trust and Savings
Bank, 73 Ind. App. 76, 123 N. B. 130 (1909) (no reservation of power to take over assets
by defendant bank and no limitation on the extent of guaranty. Dictum: ufltra tfres.
Decision for defendant on other grounds); Gardiner Trust Co. v. Augusta Trust Co.,
182 At. 685 (1936) (guaranty of deposits of another bank held vltra tires where
guarantor bank failed precluding estoppel based on benefits received, and where no
assets were assigned to the guarantor).
25. See Trust Co. of New Jersey v. Jefferson Trust Co. 186 At. 732, 736 (N. 3.
Sup. Ct. 1936) : "The [O'Connor] decision holds that it was one of the 'incidental' and
'necessary' powers of a member of a group of banks to guarantee the deposits of an
insolvent bank for the benefit of all the banks."
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banks. ' 2 6 The facts of the O'Connor case approximate the limit beyond which
legal sufferance of the banking practice of making "rescue loans" would
jeopardize the guarantor bank's depositors. In that case the guarantors were
banks with a strong credit position; they were accustomed to cooperate in
salvaging weak members of the local financial community;a- the liabilities
assumed were reasonable; and the action was taken by the guarantors as a
matter of business discretion to insure their own safety. The broad power
of guaranty approved by the dictum of the O'Connor case should be cautious-
ly used to validate guaranties -only when that course would not imperil the
guarantor's creditors.28 There may indeed be a further and more basic ob-
jection to the use of the unsecured bank guaranty. It is really a device for
allowing weak institutions to be perpetuated as liabilities to the community.
In regions already "overbanked" this consequence is particularly to be
avoided. 2 9 The shock of bank failure can be more effectively cushioned by
merger, consolidation, or, as in the principal case, by liquidation eased
through an assumption of the failing bank's liabilities in return for an assign-
ment of its sound assets,3 0 a workable solution and one consonant with the
traditional law.
EFFECT OF COLLECTING BANK'S ACCEPTANCE or DRAwE- BANK'S
REMITTANE DRAFT*
A RuRAL New York school district delivered to an adjoining district a
check drawn on a local bank for the full amount of a debt between them.
The payee deposited it for collection in a second local bank, which credited
the payee's account and presented the check by messenger to the drawee
bank. Cash was neither demanded nor offered, and the drawee bank re-
mitted its own draft on a New York City bank. At that time, March 3,
1933, the drawee cancelled the check "paid" and charged the drawer's
26. See Gardiner Trust Co. v. Augusta Trust Co., 182 Atl. 685, 689 (Me. 1936).
27. See O'Connor v. Bankers Trust Company, 289 N. Y. Supp. 252, 272 (Sup.
Ct. 1936). The "rescue parties" referred to in the opinion are the familiar Clearing
House Loans Certificates which have repeatedly been employed by the New York Clear-
ing House for the salvaging of weak members. The transfer of assets which characterizes
the Clearing House certificate arrangement would seem to distinguish it from the
situation in the O'Connor case where the alleged guaranty was completely unsecured.
O'Connor v. Bankers Trust Company supra, Plaintiff's Brief p. 13; SPRAGUE, HISTORY
OF CRISES UNDER THIE NATIONAL BANKING SYSTEM2 (1910) 45, 112, 142, 170, 314.
28. See Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Pottorf, 291 U. S. 245, 254 (1933); O'Connor v.
Bankers Trust Co., 289 N. Y. Supp. 252, 272 (Sup. Ct., 1936).
29. WILLS AND CHAPMAN, THE BANKING SITUATION (1934) 367.
30. WILLIS AND CHAPMIAN, op. cit. supra note 29, at 369; Legis. (1932) 32 COL. L.
Rv. 1395, 1402-1403.
*Matter of Central High School District No. 1 v. Union Free School District
No. 13 of the Town of Hempstead, 272 N. Y. 13, 3 N. E. (2d) 617 (1936).
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account. The ensuing bank holiday prevented payment of the remittance
draft, which was returned dishonored. On March 11, the bank of deposit
charged the amount of the original item back to the payee's account and
notified an officer of the payee district; the drawee bank recredited the
drawer's account' and marked the cancelled check "cut in error."2 When
the drawee failed to reopen for normal banking business, the payee ob-
tained a mandamus ordering the drawer to pay the original debt. After
unanimous affirmance by the Appellate Division, the Court of Appeals
reversed the order and dismissed the action,3 basing its decision both on
the "almost universal rule," hitherto unrecognized by New York courts,
that the drawer of a check is discharged " when the collecting bank accepts
the drawee's remittance draft, and on an inference drawn from a provision
in the recently enacted "Uniform" Bank Collection CodeG
Courts in almost all jurisdictions have held that the drawer and indorsers
are discharged when the drawee bank remits its own draft to the collecting
bank, even though the remittance draft is subsequently dishonored.0 These
courts usually proceed on the theory that the drawer's check authorizes the
holder to accept cash and orders the drawee to remit it; if the holder, with-
out the drawer's knowledge or consent, accepts a different medium of re-
mittance, he is said to do so for his own convenience and must assume
1. The drawer subsequently received a dividend from the Superintendent of Banks
based on his account as recredited with the amount of the check. The drawer accepted
this dividend expressly subject to the outcome of the present litigation. If the checks
were declared paid, the dividend was to be based upon the drawer's account less the
amount of the check, and any excess dividend previously received vas to be returned
to the Superintendent of Banks.
2. This is an alternative form of "cancelled by mistake."
3. Matter of Central High School District No. 1 v. Union Free School District
No. 13, 272 N. Y. 13, 3 X. E. (2d) 617 (1936). O'Brien, Crouch and Loughran,
J. J., dissented without opinion.
4. That is, the check has been collected and the original debt paid. Until col-
lection, the check was only conditional payment of the debt. See Kessler, Levi and
Ferguson, Some Aspects of Payment by Negotiable Instrument: A Conitaratih, Study
(1936) 45 YALE L. J. 1373, 1374-1376.
5. The Code was drafted by the American Bankers' Association, not by the
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. Misapprehension on this point may have ben
responsible for the celerity with which the Code was adopted by eighteen states. See
Steffen, The Check Collection Miuddle (1936) 10 TutAU, L. REv. 537, 540, w'here
the statutes are cited. New York went so far as to adopt the Code as a separate
article of the N. Y. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUmENTS LAW §§350(a)-350(I).
6. O'Leary v. Abeles, 68 Ark. 259, 57 S. NV. 791 (1900); Dewey v. Margolis
& Brooks, 195 N. C. 307, 142 S. E. 22 (1928); Jensen v. Laurel Meat Co., 71 Mont.
582, 230 Pac. 1031 (1924); Texas Electric Service Co. v. Clark, 47 S. W. (2d) 483
(Te.-c. Civ. App. 1932); see Fed. Reserve Bank v. Malloy, 264 U. S. 160, 166 (1924);
City of Douglas v. Fed. Reserve Bank, 271 U. S. 489, 493 (1926); Notes (1928)
52 A. L. R. 994, (1933) 87 A. L. R. 442. Contra: Lake Charles Feed Co. v. Sabatier,
14 La. App. 233, 125 So. 318 (1929).
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the risks entailed.7 Since payment of a check by actual transfer of cash
is comparatively rare under modem banking usage s the judicial assumption
that the drawer contemplates this method exclusively seems unrealistic.0
Its practical consequences are desirable, nevertheless, in that the time at
which payment is deemed made becomes fixed at the earliest point which
is both practicable and easily proven.'0 New York courts, however, main-
taining that, in the absence of special agreement, a .debt is not paid by
delivery to the creditor of an obligation of the debtor or of a third person,1 '
have hitherto held that the drawee's draft ii conditional payment of the
original item and becomes final payment only when it is itself satisfied1 2
7. It is sometimes said that the holder, having "waived" his right to demand
cash, is "estopped" from disclaiming the risk accompanying a different medium of
collection. Capital Grain & Feed Co. v. Fed. Reserve Bank, 3 F. (2d) 614 (N. D.
Ga. 1925); Morris v. Cleve, 197 N. C. 253, 148 S. E. 253 (1929) ; see Cleve v. Craven
Chemical Co., 18 F. (2d) 711, 713 (C. C. A. 4th, 1927).
8. Settlement of inter-bank relationships by transfer of cash would be cumber-
some and expensive. Use of exchange drafts is customary to settle both clearing house
balances and inter-city items. See SPAHR, CLEARING AND COLLECTION OF CuEcrs
(1926) 189, 462; Turnir, Bank Collections-The Direct Routing Practice (1930)
39 YALE L. J. 468, 483; Transcontinental Oil Co. v. Fed. Reserve Bank, 172 Minn.
58, 64, 214 N. W. 918, 920 (1927).
9. See Steffen and Starr, A Blue Print for the Certified Check (1935) 13 N. C. L.
REV. 450, 469, 471. Courts have often declined to alter the assumption even where
custom to the contrary was argued. Fed. Reserve Bank v. Malloyi 264 U. S. 160
(1924); 0. B. Avery Co. v. Highway Comm'r, 363 Ill. 279, 2 N.E. (2d) 77 (1936);
Nat. Bank of Commerce v. American Exch. Bank, 151 Mo. 320, 52 S. W. 265 (1899).
But cf. note 32, in!ra. Where the custom of remitting drafts was sanctioned by statute,
it has been held that the drawer consented to payment in something other than cash,
making the general rule inapplicable and extending the drawer's liability to the time
when the remittance draft itself is paid. Cleve v. Craven Chemical Co., 18 F. (2d)
711 (C. C. A. 4th, 1927) (construing the North Carolina anti-par clearance statute).
Contra: Morris v. Cleve, 197 N. C. 253, 148 S. E. 253 (1929) (under the same statute).
Cf. Braswell v. Citizens Nat. Bank, 197 N. C. 229, 148 S. E. 236 (1929) (whire the
same statute was held to relieve a collecting bank from liability for taking a draft
instead of cash); see Comment (1929) 8 N. C. L. RE¢. 55.
10. HANDBoK OF TnE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMiISSI NERS ON UNIFORM
STATE LAWS (1934) 171. In the vast majority of collections the remittance draft
will be satisfied; in these instances also the time fixed is appropriate.
11. Ward v. Evans, 2 Ld. Raym. 928 (Q. B. 1703); Turner v. Bank of Fox Lake,
3 Keyes 425 (N. Y. 1867) ;,Vail v. Foster, 4 N. Y. 312 (1850); Porter v. Talcott,
1 Cowen 359 (N. Y. 1823); Standard Investment Co. v. Town .of Snow Hill, 78 F.
(2d) 33 (C.C. A 4th, 1935); 30 Clc. 1194-1197; see BYLEs, BILs (19th ed. 1931)
303; 3 DAxIEL, NEGOTuIABLE INSTRUMENTS (7th ed. 1933)1 § 1458; Kessler, Levi and
Ferguson, supra note 4, at 1374, n. 6.
12. Thbmas v. Board of Supervisors of Westchester County, 115 N. Y. 47, 21
N. E. 674 (1889); see Smith v. Miller, 43 N. Y. 171, 175 (1870). But cf. People
ex rel. Port Chester Say. Bank v. Cromwell, 102 N. Y. 477, 7 N. E. 413 (1886).
As an alternative reason for holding that the subsequently dishonored remittance draft
does not discharge the drawer, it has been said that the weakened condition of the
drawee bank probably amounted to insolvency when the check was presented, and that
NOTES
Strict adherence to this rule would be undesirable, since, if the bank on
which a remittance draft is drawn should turn over to the bank presenting
it a new draft on some other bank, the liability of the drawer of the original
item would be unduly, if not indefinitely, extended. 3 Moreover, the New
York courts have not consistently applied the rule, and a deposit credit to
the holder oh the books of the drawee bank, equally an obligation of a
third person, constitites payment and discharges the drawer.' The courts
indeed have frequently avoided the rule by implying the required "special
agreement" to accept the new obligation as unconditional payment.a  Al-
though an agreement to accept the drawee bank's obligation in place of the
drawer's, necessary in order to discharge the latter, might have been implied
in the instant case from the holder's surrender of the item when he could
have retained it, requested legal tender, and treated the item as dishonored
in the absence of cash remittance, the court abandoned the concept com-
pletely.' 6
While the result in the instant case brings New York into line with the
bulk of authority, reliance on the Bankers' Collection Code seems to be
misplaced. The check in question was presented by messenger, and the
Code contains no express provision for the release of drawers of items not
presented by mail. It does, however, contain a provision, not expressly
limited to mail presentments, which confers on the holder of an item a
preferred claim against the assets of a drawee bank which has failed "after
having charged . . . the account of the . . . drawer . . . or otherwise
discharged his liability."'17 Since this provision contains references to pre-
the loss had already fallen on the drawer, from whom it should not be shifted to an
unsuspecting payee. See (1929) 7 N. C. L. RE.. 187, 183; Thomas v. Board of
Supervisors, 115 N. Y. 47, 54, 21 N.E. 674, 675 (189).
13. See Comment (1929) 8 N. C. L. Rev. 55, 59.
14. Cf. Oddie v. Nat. City Batik of New York, 45 N. Y. 735 (1871) ; Consolidated
Nat. Bank v. First Nat. Bank, 129 App. Div. 538, 114 N. Y. Supp. 303 (2d Dep't
1908) aff'd sithout opinion 199 N. Y. 516, 92 N. E. 1081 (1910). The fiction that
money was handed over the counter and then immediately returned by the holder as
a deposit [see (1932) 30 fi r. L. R-v. 962, 963] is equally applicable to the instant
situation, for it may be argued that, the drawee's exchange draft was "bought" with
the cash that might have been obtained in its place.
15. Where a contract calls for payment against delivery and the seller surrenders
the goohs in exchange for the credit of a third party, the courts presume that the
redit was taken as the equivalent of absolute performance. This presumption puts
on the seller the almost insurmountable burden of proving that the remittance he took
was not accepted as full payment. Hamilton v. P. S. Dickson & Co., 85 F. (2d)
107 (C. C. A. 2d, 1936); Hall v. Stevens, 116 N. Y. 201, 22 N.E. 374 (1899); Gibson
v. Tobey, 46 N. Y. 637 (1871); Noel v. Murray, 13 N. Y 167 (1855); Whithe :
v. VanNess, 11 Johns. 409 (N.Y. 1814).
16. See Matter of Central High School District No. 1 v. Union Free School
District No. 13, 272 N.Y. 13, 16, 3 N.E. (2d) 617, 618 (1936).
17. *N. Y. NEGoTrAmLE Iz wsauxmrs LAw §350(1); §13(2) of the Code as it
was proposed by "the Bankers' Association, a copy of which may be found in BRADY,
THE UNImOR NEGoT ABLE INsTRmnENTs Acr (1932 ed.) 107.
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ceding sections of the Code which were expressly confined to mailed items,18
its applicability to counter presentments is doubtful. But even if, as the
court assumes, it is so applicable, it still does not provide for a release
of the drawer whose account has here been recredited with the amount.
The import of the section is that a preferred claim arises if the drawer
has been discharged;19 but the court, ignoring the condition piecedent, con-
strues the section to mean: the holder is accorded a preferred claim and
therefore the drawer is discharged.20
The payee's failure to give timely notice of dishonor seems to be a more
tenable ground for releasing the drawer.2 ' When a negotiable instrument
is duly presented for payment, it is considered dishonored if not paid.22 If the
remittance draft in the principal case was payment, the drawer is discharged
thereby;23 if the remittance draft was not payment, the instrument was
dishonored and the failure to notify the drawer thereof before the end of
the following day 24 should release him.25 An alternative contention is that
the debiting'of the drawer's account and the remittance of a draft by the
drawee bank, by withdrawing the amount of the original check from the
funds controlled by the drawer and by making the drawee bank directly
responsible for that amount, have the same effect as acceptance or certifi-
cation, which- when procured by the holder- opetate to discharge the
drawer of the check.2, Remittance of a draft or a cashier's check is used
18. The provisions referred to are §§7 and 11 of the Code. N.Y.NEGOTIADL
INSTIrMENTS LAW §§350(f) and 350().
19. In re Jayne & Mason, 140 Misc. 822, 251 N. Y. Supp. 768 (Sup. Ct. 1931)
semble; see Townsend, The Bank Collection Code of the American Bankers' elssocla-
lion (1934) 8 TULANE L. Rsv. 376, 380-381. But see Matter of State Bank of Bing-
hamton, 152 Misc. 579, 583, 274 N.Y. Supp. 41, 47 (Sup. Ct. 1934).
20. Matter of Central High School District No. 1 v. Union Free School District
No. 13, 272 N.Y. 13, 17, 3 N.E. (2d) 17, 18 (1936).
21. Odle v. Barnes, 117 Tex. 174, 2 S.W. (2d) 577 (1927); see BRANNAN AND
CHAPEE, THE "NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW (5th ed. 1932) §§ 103, 89.
In the instant case, the only act which may be called notice of dishonor occurred
eight days after the presentment, when the treasurer of the payee, who was also a
clerk of the drawer, was orally informed that the remittance draft had not been
satisfied and that the original check was being returned.
22. BRANNAN AND CHAFEE, THE NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTs LAW (5th ed. 1932)
§83.
23. Id. at §119.
24. See id. at § 103.
25. BRANNAN AND CHAFEe, THE NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW (5th ed. 1932)
§ 89; see Kessler, Levi and Ferguson, supra note 4, at 1387-1388, 1392. There is a
possibility, however, that the court might have held that notice of dishonor was un-
necessary under N. Y. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW § 185(4). Cf. Jones v. Board
of Education, 242 App. Div. 17, 272 N. Y. Supp. 5 (2d Dep't 1934). See BRANNAN
AND CHAFEE, THE NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW (5th ed. 1932) § 114(4).
26. BRANNAN AND CHAFEE, THE NEGOTIABLE INSTRUIMENTS LAW (5th ed. 1932)
§ 188.
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as an alternative to certification by some banks, -  and has been deemed
equivalent to certification in at least one case. $
As between the drawer and the holder, then, the weight of the law puts
the collection risk in question upon the holder, but it seems inequitable that
either party should have to bear it. Many decisions have placed this risk
upon the collecting bank, under the doctrine that an agent accepts at his
peril anything other than money upon the account of a draft owing to his
principal.28 This result has been commended because the collecting bank
is often in a position to know the financial standing of the drawee bank,
and can demand cash if it is not satisfied with the drawee's credit. 0 The
rule has been weakened, however, by statute,3 ' by judicial recognition of
banking custom,32 and by the use of restrictive stipulations on deposit
slips.33 The holder, whose credit at the bank of deposit has been charged
back, is thus left in an unenviable position. Its original claim on the drawer
is "paid," although it has as yet received nothing. Its preferred claim against
the insolvent drawee is of doubtful value.3 - Consequently, the holder may
27. See Steffen -nd Starr, suPra note 9, at 459, 479. On the effect of certification,
see 6 ZorarAxxN, BAzms AN BAvxnG (1936) § 3854.
23. Odle v. Barnes, 117 Te. 174, 2 S.V. (2d) 577 (1927).
29. Fed. Reserve Bank v. Malloy, 264 U. S. 160 (1924); Fifth Nat. Bank v.
Ashworth, 123 Pa. St. 212, 16 At. 596 (1839) ; Nat. Bank of Commerce v. American
Exch. Bank, 151 Mo. 320, 52 S. W. 265 (1S99); Noble v. Doughten, 72 KaM 336,
83 Pac. 1048 (1905); cf. Anderson v. Gill, 79 Md. 312, 29 AtL 527 (I894); see
1 MORSE, B.rs MW BANn=GN (6th ed. 1928) §247; 1 Mscmu, A micy (2d ed.
1914) § 946.
30. This'is especially true for local presentments. See (1933) 81 U. or PA. L RE.
994, 995; LNnnoOn: oF THE NATIONAL CoNEraNc oF CoesaxssxoZu's oI" UrWroau
STATE LAWS (1931) 256, 276; cf. Turner, mipra note 8, at 483, 4S4.
31. The states which permitted the collecting bank to accept remittance drafts in
lieu of currency by statute prior to the drafting of the Bankers' Collection Code are
collected in (1933) 81 U. or PA. L. Rsv. 994. The Bankers' Collection Code relieves
the collecting banks of liability for taking a draft "where ordinary care is enercke .'
§9. N. Y. N-oTmBrx Iismrusxaums LAw §350(h).
32. Cattaruzza v. First Nat. Bank, 106 W. Va. 458, 146 S. E. 393 (1928) ; United
States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Forest County State Bank, 199 Wis. 560, 227 N.W.
27 (1929) ; Barnes v. People's Bank, 194 N. C. 371, 139 S. B. 689 (1927) ; f. 'Adams
County v. Meadows Valley Bank, 47 Idaho 646, 277 Pac. 575 (1929).
33. See Pierson, Legislation Relating to Problems of C/tec Colleclion (1928)
14 A.B.A.J. 406; Comment (1933) 46 EA v. L REV. 687; (1933) 81 U. or PA.
L. REv. 994. E. S. Macomber Co. v. Commercial Bank, 166 S. C. 236, 164 S. . 596
(1932); Jefferson County Bldg. & L. Ass'n v. Southern Bank & T. Co., 225 Ala. 25,
142 So. 66 (1932); Fergus County v. Fed. Reserve Bank, 75 Mont 582, 244 PacQ
883 (1926).
34. The time for making such claim may have elapsed. The assets of the faied
bank may not cover even the preferred claims, if he gets one. In those cases -where
the drawee happens to be a national bank instead of a state bank, no preferred claim
will be allowed. Old Company's Lehigh v. Meeker, 294 U.S. 227 (1935); Jennings
v. U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 294 U. S. 216 (1935); Spradlin v. Royal f9g. Co.,
73 F. (2d) 776 (C.C.A. 4th, 1934); see Comment (1935) 13 N.C.L. RE7. 4S7.
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take a sizable loss for no better reason than that some one has to suffer for
the imperfections of the collection process. It would seem that a more
equitable allocation of collection risks could be achieved by extending the
Federal Deposit Insurance statute to include collections. 36 Such action,
supplemented by state legislation, would eliminate much 'of the prevailing
loss and uncertainty.
INDISPENSABLE PARTIES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS AS AFFECTED
BY THE DOCTRINE OF SOVEREIGN IMMXUNITY*
ACTING as the agent of the Philippine Islands, the Secretary of War,
opened deposit accounts in certain national banks, which pledged assets in
the form of bonds as security, as required by a Philippihe statute. Upon the
insolvency of the banks, these bonds were sold by the Secretary and the
proceeds deposited with the defendant bank to the credit of the Philippine
Government. Suit was then brought by the receivers of the insolvent banks
to impress this fund with a'trust for the benefit of all their creditors and
stockholders on the ground that the pledge was idira vires. The defendant
depositary bank moved to dismiss the complaint, alleging that the Philippine
Government was an indispensable party, immune from suit without its
consent. In making its interlocutory ruling, the court found it unnecessary
to deal with the question of immunity. It held that under the recent decisions
of the Supreme Court, pledges by national banks to secure deposits are ultra
vires and void in the absence of express Congressional authority,2 and that,
as a consequence, the transfer and even the subsequent sale of the bonds and
deposit of the proceed's passed no interest to the intended pledgee, or to his
principal, the Philippine government, who, therefore, could not be considered
an indispensable party where title to those deposit accounts was at issue.
3
35. See Steffen, supra note 5, at 556.
*Baldwin v. Chase National Bank of New York, U. S. Dist. Ct. (S.D. N. Y.),
August 5, 1936.
1. See Pmn. REV. ADmimsTRATv.w CODE (1917) § 625.
2. Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Pottorff, 291 U.S. 245 (1934) ; City of Marion v. Sneeden,
291 U. S. 262 (1934). "
3. The statement of the instant court that an uitra vires pledge when executed
passes no interest to the'intended pledgee is not supported by several Supreme Court
authorities, which hold that such a transfer is valid until set aside in a direct proceeding
instituted for that purpose. Logan County Bank v. Townsend, 139 U. S. 67 (1891);
Kerfoot v. Farmers' & Merchants' Bank, 218 U. S. 281 (1910). The question of
sovereign immunity was not involved, however, in either of these cases.
It is obvious that the Philippine Government, under the ordinary rules of federal
equity practice, would be termed an indispensable party to the suit so long as it could
be said to have any interest in the deposited sums. United States v. Bank & Trust Co.,
296 U. S. 463 (1936). A federal court may not proceed in the absence of an indis-
pensable party, although it may do so in the case of a proper or of a necessary party.
Doats, FEDERAL JuRrsDIclroT' AND PROCEDURE (1928) § 68. For a useful set of rules
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The rule of sovereign immunity from suit4 is mitigated in certain instances,
to protect individuals against illegal acts, by holding that suits against officials
in their individual capacity are not suits against the state, so long as the
decree will neither subject it to liability nor directly affect its interests.-
This result has been reached where the agent had control of property to
which the state was held to have no legal title,0 or where he was actingr
beyond the scope of his authority,7 or under an unconstitutional statute or
an illegal order 8 It has also been held that the state is not an indispensable
party where suit is brought to compel performance of a purely ministerial
duty or to compel the exercise of discretion,9 although mandamus will not
lie to determine the result of an exercise of discretion or where such a decree,
would interfere with the general powers and functions of government 10 In
all such cases, the state, on the merits of the pleadings, would seem to have
a direct interest in the controversy, and thus qualify under the ordinary
rule as an indispensable party, so that the suit could not proceed in its ab-
sence. But the courts avoid this result, and retain jurisdiction of the suit,
determining the merits of the case to decide the preliminary issue of parties,
as to when a party is indispensable, see Roos v. Texas Co., 23 F. (2d) 171, 172 (C. C.
A. 2d, 1927).
4. 3 WLOUGHBY, CoNsTIrUrTON OF THE UNITED STATEs (2d ed. 1929) § 887.
5. See Hyneman, Judicial Interprcltion of The Elev, nth Amcndment (1927) 2
Iwo. L. J. 371. A distinction seems to be made in the cases between suits for injunctions
and those claiming affirmative relief. See Cunningham v. Macon & Brunswick r . R.,
109 U. S. 446, 451-452 (1883); Pennoyer v. McConnaughy, 140 U. S. 1, 16 (1891).
An individual, in the absence of consent on the part of the state, has no remedy against
it for breach of contract. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S. 1 (1890). And this is also
true where suit is formally brought against one of its agents. Hagood v. Southern, 117
U. S. 52 (1886); Hooe v. United States, 213 U. S. 322 (1910). It has also been
held that the state is an indispensable party where a decree in favor of the plaintiff
would force the official to pay out sums from the state treasury. Governor of Georgia
v. Madrazo, 1 Pet. 110 (U S. 182); Lankford v. Platte Iron Works Co., 235 U. S.
461 (1915). It would thus appear that no redress could have been avarded the plaintiff
in the instant case had the sums in question been taken to the Philippines and there
placed in the treasury.
6. United States v. Peters, 5 Cranch. 115 (U. S. 1809) ; Osborn v. Bank,: of United
States, 9 Wheat. 738 (U. S. 1824) ; United States v. Lee, 106 U. S. 196 (182) ; Tindal
v. Wesley, 167 U. S. 204 (1897) ; Correa v. Barbour, 71 F. (2d) 9 (C. C.A. 1st, 1934) ;
O'Connor v. Rhodes, 79 F. (2d) 146 (App. D. C. 1935); see 3 Wnt.ouGrai, op. cit.
mipra note 4, § 913.
7. Johnson v. Lankford, 245 U.S. 541 (1918) ; Northern Pac. Ry. v. North Dakota,
250 U. S. 135 (1919).
8. Poindex-ter v. Greenhow, 114 U. S. 270 (1884); EX parie Young, 209 U. S.
123 (1908); Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33 (1915); Greene v. Interurban R. L, 244
U. S. 499 (1917).
9. Roberts v. United States, 176 U. S. 221 (1900); Miguel v. M Carl. 291 U. S.
442 (1934).
10. McCarl v. Rogers, 48 F. (2d) 1023 (App. D. C. 1931); McCarI v. Hoeppel,
68 F. (2d) 440 (App. D. C. 1933) ; see Cunningham v. Macon & Brunswick R.- R, 109
U. S. 446, 452 (1883).
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concluding, if the ilaintiff is found to be-right, that the state can be dispensed
with as a party since its claim is thus-revealed as groundless."
The paradoxical quality of such reasoning is well exemplified by the frank
admission of the judge in the instant case that he evaluates the claims of the
parties as they might ultimately be determined in order to decide how their
interests in the action should be classified, prior to the trial on the merits.
There are substantial reasons to view the Philippine Government as an
indispensable party in the present suit since it, and not the defendant bank,
claimed ownership of the funds on deposit, 12 a claim which will be determined
by an adjudication of other claims for the money, so as to require the claimant
as an indispensable party. Not being bound by the decree, it could sue the
defendant bank and conceivably subject it to double liability.13 This possi-
bility is an additional reason for considering its presence indispensable to the
suit, since the courts have generally held that a decree must bind all those
who might otherwise subject the defendant to further litigation over the same
claim.' 4 Although the immunity of the Philippines'; was not dealt with in
11. E.'r parle Young, 209 U. S. 123, 159 (1908). For a case making use of this
substantive approach, but determining that the United States was an indispensable party,
since a decision of the ultimate question would necessitate the interpretation of a
doubtful statute, upon whose construction all interested parties had a right to.be heard,
see Louisiana v. Garfield, 211 U. S. 70 (1908).
12. It has usually been held that those having an interest in a fund are indispensable
parties where the decree sought might so operate upon the fund as to put it beyond.
the reach of the absentees. Russell v. Clark's Executors, 7 Cranch 69 (U. S. 1812);
Williams v. Bankhead, 19 Vall. 563 (U. S.- 1873) ; Gregory v. Stetson, 133 U. S. 579
(1890) ; United States v. Bank of New York & Trust Co., 296 U. S. 463 (1936) ; see 1
STREET, F ERAL EQUITY PRAcTICE (1909) § 520.
13. REv. STAT. § 737 (1875), 28 U. S. C. § 111 (1934); SUPREME COURT EQUITY
RULE 39 (1912) ; see Correa v. Barbour, 71 F. (2d) 9, 12 (C. C. A. 1st, 1934).
14. Goodman v. Niblack, 102 U. S. 556 (1880); Walsh v. Memphis, C. & N. R. R.,
6 Fed. 797 (C. C. E. D. 'Mo. 1881) ; Continental Adjustmenmt Co. v. Cook, 152 Fed. 652
(C. C. E. D. Wis. 1906). Such a recovery appears rather remote; since the Supreme
Court would be the court of last resort in the suit attacking the validity of the pledge
as well as in that brought by the Philippine Government to recover the deposited sums.
26 STAT. 828 (1891), 28 U.S.C. §347 (1934); 43 STAT. 940 (1925), 28 U.S.C. §349
(1934) ; cf. 47 STAT. 765 (1933), 48 U. S. C. § 1237 (6) (1934).
15. It appears that the subpoena in the instant case was served a few hours before
the Commonwealth of the Philippine Islands was established on November 15, 1935.
The United States, however, has retained some power of supervision over their affairs
until July 4, 1946. 47 STAT. 761-770 (1933), 48 U. S. C. §§ 1231-1247 (1934). It seems
that the Philippines would be immune from suit as an insular possession of the United
States. See Merritt v. Government of the Philippine Islands, 34 Phil. 311, 316 (1916) ;
MALCOLm, GoVaExRN T OF THE PHILIPPI"E ISLANDS (1916) § 126; 1 W .LaouGny, op.
cit. supra note 4, § 278. Porto Rico has been held immune from suit without its consent.
Porto Rico v. Rosaly, 227 U. S. 270 (1913). And so too has Eiawaii. Xawananakoa v.
Polybank, 205 U. S. 349 (1907). Nor would the result be different if the Philippines
were considered an independent sovereignty, for then it would be granted immunity as
a matter of comity, cf. Williams v. Suffolk Ins. Co., 13 Pet. 415 (U. S. 1839); OetJen v.
Central Leather Co., 246 U. S. 297 (1918).
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the opinion, its tenor makes evident that this consideration must have counted
heavily with the court, whose method of examining the substance of the
case before deciding the jurisdictional question of parties would thus appear
apparently in line with precedent.10
The court's evident desire to subordinate the much criticized principle of
sovereign immunity17 to the policy of permitting each depositor to share in
a pro rata distribution of the assets of an insolvent bank is not open to ob-
jection, but the soundness of the decision can be questioned upon eithdr of
two grounds. In the first place, the plaintiffs' right to a recovery on the
merits has not been established; for, although the Supreme Court in several
cases has held that pledges by national banks to secure deposits are iltra vires,
those decisions may be distinguished. A Philippine statute, in force when
the deposits were made, provided that government funds should be deposited
only in those banks which would advance such security. s1 Since this statute
was not annulled when it was reported to Congress,10 it might be Eonsidered
an act of Congress for the purpose of rendering valid the pledges in question.
It is probable, however, that the express Congressional authorization required
by the Supreme Court could not be spelled out in this manner; for it has
generally been held that the mere failure of Congress to annul a law reported
to it does not stamp that law with its express approval.20 Moreover, the
pledge to secure the Philippine deposits had been executed and the pledged
bonds sold,21 although it is doubtful whether this fact alone would take the
case without the policy laid down by the Supreme Court against giving effect
to udtra vires pledges by national banks. That the merits of the case, however,
were not crystal clear would not of itself prevent the evasion .of the doctrine
of sovereign immunity under the authorities, and the main ground for
criticizing the result reached by the court lies in the fact that the proceeds
from the sale of the pledged securities were deposited along with other
Philippine funds in accounts with the defendant bank which were active. As
a result, -when the -issue of tracing trust funds comes before the court, the
16. See cases cited supra, notes 5-11.
17. See Borchard, Tprt Liability of the State (1930) 12 J. Co.w. LEo. & Izr. L.
(x. s.) 1, at 2-3.
1S. PHrr. REv. Axi-,risraaTv CODE (1917) § 625.
19. 39 STAT. 551 (1916), 43 U. S. C. § 1054 (1934) ; 56 Coi. REc. 68, 104 (1917).
20. Miners' Bank v. Iowa, 12 How. 1 (U. S. 1851); Clayton v. Utah Territory,
132 U. S. 632 (I890); Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U. S. 189 (1923); United
States v. Bull, 15 Phil. 7 (1910).
21. Cf. National Bank of Xenia v. Stewart, 107 U. S. 676 (1882). In this case,
one f.,fillan advanced to the bank certain shares of its own capital stock as security
for a previously contracted debt. The receipt by the bank of such shares as security
was e\pressly prohibited by statute. Recovery against the bank was denied, however,
on the ground that the pledge had been executed. The Xenia case can be distinguished
from the one at bar in that in the latter case the policy of the statutory restriction, i.e.,
to protect the bank, would have been thwarted by permitting recovery against the bank
for the proceeds of the executed pledge.
22. See United States v. Lee, 106 U. S. 196 (1882). But cf.,Louisiana Y. Garfield,
211 U. S. 70 (1908).
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entire deposit account of the Philippine Government will be' subjected to
judicial scrutiny, and consequently the case on the merits will place in jeopardy
property which admittedly belongs to the Philippines, 23 whose presence to
the suit has been termed not indispensable. Such a position is without the
support of precedent.
A further criticism may be directed at the decision in that it does not deal
with the question of immunity, and therefore might be considered as sanc-
tioning as a general practice the procedure of arriving at a conclusion upon
the merits before determining the question of parties, a method used in the
present case as an escape from the doctrine of sovereign immunity to permit
relief to an otherwise remediless plaintiff.24 Where some court, however,
would afford the requisite jurisdiction, no justification remains for the use
of a procedure which permits a case to be heard in the absence of the prin-
ciple party in interest, who would normally be in the position to offer the
best defense, and whose interests might be irreparably injured by the decree.
VALIDITY OF ABSENTEE REGISTRATION"
IN 1935 the Florida legislature enacted laws to allow absent, registered
electors to vote by mail from without the state at all elections and to permit
absent citizens to register by mail.1 At a primary election where a few votes
cast by persons registered under the new act were decisive, those votes were
challenged. The Florida Supreme Court found the absentee registration law
unconstitutional because the statutory oath deviated from the one required
by the state constitution 2 and invalid because registration as the first step
in voting is a sovereign act of an individual citizen which therefore must be
performed within the state. While subsequent legislation might easily remedy
the defective oath, the second objection renders absentee registration forever
23. It would be immaterial in this regard whether the court followed the "first in,
first out' rule or adhered to the theory that where a trustee draws money out of a
mixed account, he is presumed to draw out his own funds until they become exhausted.
For a discussion of these two rules, see Hirsch, Tracing Trust Fu nds-Modern Docirine€
(1936) 11 TEMP. L. Q. 11.
24. This substantive approach was used, however, in Hamilton v. Savannah, F. & W.
Ry., 49 Fed. 412 (C. C. S. D. Ga. 1892), although the question of sovereign immunity
was not involved in the suit.
*State ex rel. Gandy v. Pace, 169 So. 854 (Fla. 1936); (1936) 5 GEo. WAsur, L.
Rzv. 124.
1. FLA. Comp. GEN. LAws ANN. (Slillman, Supp. 1936) §438. Since many
citizens of Florida are absent during the hot summer and fall months, absentee voting is
especially desirable and absentee registration is a logical complement, for registration in.
a constitutional prerequisite to voting. FLA. CoNsT. art: VI, § 2.
2. F... CoxsT. art. VI, § 3. The court also inferred the necessity of personat
registration from the constitutional requirement that naturalized citizens produce to
the registration officers their certificates of naturalization. FLA. CONST. art. VI, § 1.
State ex rel. Gandy v. Pace, 169 So. 854 (Fla. 1936).
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NOTES
unavailable in Florida, even by constitutional amendment.3 But it seems a
confusing use of metaphor to describe registration and voting as sovereign
acts,4 and a mistake of law to assume that such acts are capable of being ex-
ercised only within the territorial boundaries of the state in which the elector
is one of the sovereigns.5 Never before has the vague descriptive concept of
sovereignty been mentioned when considering the validity of such legislation.
Although no other court has passed directly upon the validity of an absentee
registration statute0 absentee voting statutes have generally been upheld,7
and where they have been held invalid, all the decisions have turned upon a
fairly direct interpretation of a relevant constitutional provision rather than
upon vague doctrines of law or political theory.8
It appears, however, that the desire of the court to minimize election frauds
rather than its respect for doctrines of sovereignty motivated the invalidation
of what it deemed to be an unsound registration law. The purpose of regis-
tration is to prevent illegal voting by permitting only those citizens to cast
ballots who can be identified as properly qualified electors. Since the era
of the Civil War every state has found it imperative to adopt some form
of registration law as well as other reforms in election administration, and
3. Since the court assumes that it is beyond the legitimate jurisdiction of the
state to confer the privilege of absentee registration, such an amendment would bh in-
effective.
4. The Florida court was apparently impressed with the fact that conceptually the
people are the ultimate source of sovereign power delegated by them to the state and
that voting is an exercise of this power. .See CooL-Y, Cozzs'nTu' iorAL L raTo1.s
(Sth ed. 1927) pp. 3, 4, Si, 82, 1354.
5. It hardly seems an extension of a state's jurisdiction beyond its borders. [Cf.
Blackmer v. United States, 284 U. S. 421 (1932)] to permit it to grant the privilege of
absentee registration to its absent citizens. See Jenkins v. State Board of Elections, ISO
N. C. 169, 171, 104 S. F. 346, 347 (1920).
6. In Clark v. Nash, 192 Ky. 594, 234 S. NV. 1 (1921), absentee voting was held
unconstitutional, but that part of the same law which allowed absentee registration was
said, by way of dictum, to be valid. See Jenkins v. State Board of Elections, ISO N. C.
169, 175, 104 S. E. 346, 349 (1920) where it was said that absentee registration if ever
enacted in North Carolina would be invalid only because directly in conflict with the
states constitution.
7. Absentee voting laws are in effect in forty states. A typical decision upholding
the validity of such a law is Moore v. Pullem, 150 Va. 174, 142 S. F. 415 (1923).
See Notes (1921) 14 A.L.R. 1256, (1922) 19 A.L.R. 303, (1925) 35 A.L.R. 819;
(1936) 5 Gao. WAsu. L Ray. 124, 125.
8. Bourlard v. Hildreth, 26 Cal. 161 (1864); Opinion of the Judges, 30 Conn. 591
(1862) ; Clark v. Nash, 192 Ky. 594, 234 S. NV. 1 (1921) ; People v. Blodgett, 13 MIch.
127 (1865); Thompson v. Scheier, 57 P. (2d) 293 (N. If. 1936); Baca v. Ortiz, 61
P. (2d) 320 (N. "L 1936); Opinion of the Justices, 44 N. H. 633 (1863); Opinion of
the Justices, 80 N. H. 595, 113 At. 293 (1921); Chase v. Miller, 41 Pa. 403 (1862) ;
Lancaster City's Fifth Ward Election, 281 Pa. 131, 126 Aft. 199 (1924); Opinion of
the judges, 37 Vt. 665 (1864). Revisions of state constitutions or constitutional amend-
ments have removed the constitutional infirmities on which the civil war decisions were
predicated.
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these measures have made election frauds at least more difficult, if not im-
possible.9 The court apparently considered the Florida absentee registration
law an unwise backwvard step, since it provided a relatively convenient method
of evading election laws. If physical presence, upon which the state's criminal
jurisdiction is normally predicated, is not compelled at some time during the
voting process, there is no practical means by which the state may deter
and punish those who attempt to register and vote by mail from without the
state by misrepresenting themselves to be qualified 'electors 1 Such a person
would not be subject to rendition on demand by Florida;"' for, although he
has committed a crime which is properly punishable in Florida," rendition
is available as a matter of constitutional right only against fugitives from
justice, and a fugitive is one who has committed at least part of the crime
in the demanding" state and then fled therefrom. 13 While election frauds can
be effectively curbed only by honest, competent administration of an efficient
system, the threat of prosecution is an essential ingredient of a comprehensive
election plan. Although there is some weight in the court's conqern for the
purity of the Florida ballot, that anxiety may prove unfounded as a practical
matter; for no special problems of election fraud have been .reported in those
states which permit extra-state registration and voting.14
The decision, however, may have indirect effects on permanent registration
and absentee voting in Florida. Approximately 30 states have recently enacted
some form of permanent registration, and when the law has been properly
formulated, its competent administration has proven to be more convenient,
efficient, and economical than the old system of periodic registration, and has
decreased election frauds.'5 Since there is less need for absentee registration
under a system of permanent registration,10 the decision in the principal
9. See HARIs, REGISTRATION OF VOTERS IN THE UNITED STATES (1929) c. 1, 3;
HARIus, ELEcriox AmriisTRATioN 11N THE UNITED STATES (1932) 381.
10. There are statutes in Florida, as in every other state, which make fraudulent
registratidn or voting a crime punishable by fine and or imprisonment. FLA. Con'. GEN.
LAWVS ANN. (Skillman, 1927) §§ 8154-8157, 8163, 8171, 8179, 8200, 8201.
11. U. S. CoxsT. Art. IV, §2 cl. 2; REv. STAT. § 5278 (1875), 18 U.S. C. § 662
(1934). See 2 MLooRE, EXTRADITION AND INTERSTATE RENDITION (1891) c. 1.
12. See United States v. Bowman, 260 U. S. 94 (1922) ; cf. American Banana Co.
v. United Fruit Co., 213 U. S. 347 (1909).
13. Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U. S. 280 (1911). See 2 MooRE, op. cit. supra note 11,
at c. 4; Elpern, Important Phases of the Law of Interstate Extradition (1930) 33 LAW,
NoTEs 188; (1927) 41 H.Av. L. REv. 74.
14. See HARRIs, ELEcrION AD.MNISTRATION (1934) 381. Arizona, California, Iowa,
Michigan, Minnesota, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Tennessee and Washington all
allow registration and voting by mail, at least in certain counties. No resulting election
frauds have been reported.
15. See HARRIS, REGISRATION OF .VOr ES IN THE UNITE STATES (1929) at 17;
Pollock, Election Administration in Michigan (1934) 23 NAT. MfuNIc. REv. 343; (1932)
21 NAr. Mu ic. R v. 659; (1935) 24 NAT. MuNIc. REv. 118. But see (1936) 25 NAT.
MUNIc. REV. 98.16. See HARus, op. cit. supra note 15, at 206.
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case may hasten its adoption in the state primary elections. 7 But the in-
validity of absentee voting in Florida appears predetermined by the principal
decision, unless the court is willing to distinguish it on the ground that the
sovereign act of voting occurs at the election office where the ballot is cast
and not outside the state where it is marked by the elector, whereas the
sovereign act of registration occurs where the elector fills out the registration
application blank. 8 Although such result would be highly illogical, it is far
from improbable.1 9 Thirty-nine states, excluding Florida, now allow regis-
tered electors to vote by mail from without the state, 0 and even though the
number of absentee ballots usually cast is disappointingly small, such pro-
visions are generally considered desirable. 2  Furthermore, in two cases
decided since the principal one in which the validity of the Florida absentee
voting law was attacked, the7 court declined to pass upon its constitution-
ality ;m a situation which may suggest that the court is reluctant to invalidate
the statute.
CONFLICT OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN FEDERAL AND STATE
CouRTs wn'H R sPEcr To WATER RIGHTS"
IN 1903 a state court entered a final decree fixing the respective priorities
of various claimants to the water of a Montana creek, enjoining them from
interfering with each other's rights as determined, and appointing a water
17. At present there is permanent registration in Florida in general elections but in
the primaries, which are the really important state elections, there is biennial registration
in most counties. See FA. Gm. Cou'. L..ws AznT. (Skillnman, 1927) §§ 364, 366, 367.
18. Presumably it could be argued that the post office was the absent elector's agent
and that the vote is not cast until it is put in the ballot box by the precinct election officer,
also the elector's agent. But in the act of registration, the fraud may occur vhere
the oath of registration is taken and not when the registration certificate is delivered to
the registrar.
19. See Jenkins v. State Board of Elections, 180 N. C. 169, 175, 104 S. E. 346, 349
(1920); (1936) 5 GEo. V Asm L. REv. 124, 125.
20. In Kentucky, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, New Jersey, Oklahoma, Pennsyl-
vania, and South Carolina absentee voting laws have either been repealed or declared
unconstitutional except that in four ,of the above states absentee voting is allowed to
those in military service. See HRems, ErxcnorT AmDnmrsTR'nTo.r (1934) c. 3.
21. See id. at 63, 293.
22. In State ex -el. Gandy v. Pace, 170 So. 118 (Fla., 1936), which continued the
principal litigation, the court held that personal registrations were not subject to collat-
eral attack by mandamus which is permissible only when the jurisdiction to register is
attacked, as it was in the principal case.
State ex rel. Titus v. Peacock, 170 So. 309 (Fla., 1936) held that the constitu-
tionality of the absent voters' law could not be collaterally attacked by mandamus but
must be left undecided until appropriately presented in some litigation wherein the
affected voters may defend their rights, if any, which eist under the alleged un-
constitutional laws.
*Sain v. Montana Power Co., 84 F. (2d) 126 (C. C. A 9th. 1936).
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commissioner, pursuant to statute, to apportion the waters of the stream
accordingly. A commissioner was still in authority thirty years later when
a controversy between the successors in interest of the original parties
culminated in a suit in the federal courts to enjoin the defendant from inter-
fering with th6 plaintiff's adjudicated rights by changing its diversion points.
The trial court dismissed the complaint without motion because of the prior
assumption of jurisdiction by the state court and its exercise of continuing
control over the creek through water commissioners.1 The order of dis-
missal was reversed by the Circuit Court of Appeals. 2
Where a state and a federal court have concurrent jurisdiction, of an action
in ren, the court which first acquires jurisdiction obtains exclusive authority
to control and dispose of the res, so that the other is precluded on principles
of comity from exercising jurisdiction over thd same res to defeat or impair
the jurisdiction of the first court.3 Although the rule is nowhere clearly
expressed, it seems to comprehend only those situations where the first suit
is in ren and the second suit is either in rem or an in personam adjudica-
tion that will tend to interfere with the control of the first court,4 such as
an action of ejectment brought after the appointment by another court of
a receiver of realty.5 Actions to adjudicate water rights have uniformly
been held in ren in this connection.6 The application of this rule generally,
1. Sam v. Montana Power Co., 5 F. Supp. 792 (D. Mont. 1934).
2. Sain v. Montana Power Co., 84 F. (2d) 126 (C. C. A. 9th, 1936).
3. Kline v. Burke Construction Co., 260 U. S. 226 (1922). See generally Durfce
and Sloss, Federal Injunction Against Proceedings In State Courts: The Life History
of a Statute (1932) 30 MbcH. L. Rv. 1145; Taylor and Willis, The Power of Federal
Courts to Enjoin Proceedings in State Courts (1933) 42 YA=. L. J. 1169; Warren,
Federal and State Court Interference (1930) 43 HAv. L. Rav. 345.
4. Cf. Durfee and Sloss, supra note 3, at 1164. The rule of comity is applied
although the same party has initiated both actions. Garner v. Second Nat. Bank of
Providence, 67 Fed. 833 (C. C. A. Ist, 1895); Marchant v. Wannamaker, 176 S. C.
369, 180 S. E. 350 (1935). But cf. (1927) 36 YALI. L. J. 419. And it would seem
that a party attaching a res in one jurisdiction should not be able later to attach the
same res after its removal in some manner to a more convenient jurisdiction. Cf.
(1926) 40 IfHAv. L. Rav. 314. It is not .certain, however, whether garnishment Is
in ren for purposes of the rule of comity. Compare Nat. Fire Ins. Co. v. Sanders,
38 F. (2d) 212 (C. C. A. 5th, 1930), with Harvey v. Great No. Ry., 50 Minn. 405,
52 N. W. 905 (1892); ef. Penn Gen. Casualty Co. v. Pennsylvania, 294 U. S. 189,
195 (1935). In cases not falling within the rule of comity both courts may proceed
until a judgment is obtained in one court which may. be pleaded as res judicata in the
other. Penn Gen. Casualty Co. v. Pennsylvania, supra.
5. Barnett v. Mayes, 43 F. (2d) 521 (C. C. A. 10th, 1930); ef. United States
v. Bank of N. Y. & Trust Co., 296 U. S. 463 (1936).
6. Rickey Land & Cattle Co. v. Miller'& Lux, 218 U. S. 258 (1910). Water right
adjudications have also been likened frequently to suits to quiet title (Tulare Irr. Dist.
v. Lindsay-Strathmore Irr. Dist., 3 Cal. (2d) 489, 45 P. (2d) 972 (1935)] and to
partition land [In re Silvies River, 199 Fed. 495 (D. Ore. 1912)], both of which are
in rem for the purposes of the rule of comity [Dennison Brick &'Tile Co. v. Chicago
Trust Co., 286 Fed. 818 (C. C. A. 6th, 1923) (quiet title) ; Martin v. Baldwin, 19 Fed.
340 (C. C. D. Cal. 1884) (partition land)].
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however, has occasioned much difficulty; for the distinction between actions
in rein and actions in personam is at best an uncertain one,7 and, if the first
action is held to be in ren and the second in personam, the further diffi-
culty arises of determining when the jurisdiction of the first court would
be impaired by the second action and when it would not.8 Thus, the Circuit
Court of Appeals declared the principle of comity inapplicable, although it
apparently recognized that the state court was exercising continuing control
over the res through its commissioner,0 on the ground that the federal
court had not been requested to assert jurisdiction in ren over the waters
in dispute, but only to issue an in personain adjudication, which would not
interfere with the water commissioner in his administration of the res..
This conclusion seems untenable" 'even if the doubtful assumption be made
that the second action was in personam, unlike the first. Direct conflict
would seem no less likely where two courts seek to distribute a limited supply
of water' 2 than where they attempt to apportion a limited fund of assets
through different receivers.'
3
Irrespective of principles of comity, moreover, the exercise of jurisdiction
by the federal courts in a situation of this sort would seem to be an abuse
of discretion. The economical and effective adjudication of water rights has
-been one of the most persistent problems of the semi-arid states. The
endless litigation, multiplicity of suits and uncertainty with respect to vrater
7. 'See Durfee and Sloss, supra note 3, at 1163; Dodd, Eqity Rece',ershaips as
Proceedings in Rein (1928) 23 IrL. L. REv. 105.
. Compare, e.g., Riehle v. Margolies, 279 U. S. 218 (1929), with United States
v. Bank of N. Y. & Trust Co., 296 U. S. 463 (1936); see also Comment (1930) 43
H ,v. L. Rav. 462.
9. The control of a court officer, suchoas a receiver, acting subject to the orders
of a court, is generally held equivalent to that of the court itself, even though he is
a statutory officer. United States v. Bank of N. Y. & Trust Co., 296 U. S. 463 (1936);
see Rocky Ford Canal Co. v. Cox, 59 P. (2d) 935, 938 (Utah 1936).
10. Cf. Penn Gen. Casualty Co. v. Pennsylvania, 294 U. S. IS9,.195 (1935).
11. Rickey Land & Cattle Co. v. Miller & Lux, 218 U. S. 253 (1910); Pitt v.
Rodgers, 104 Fed. 387 (C. C. A. 9th, 1900); United States v. American Ditch Ass'n,
2 F. Supp. 867 (D. Idaho 1933); cf. Twin Falls Land & Water Co. v. Twin Falls
Canal Co., 7 F. Supp. 238 (D. Idaho 1933). But cf. Pacific Live Stock Co. v. Lewis,
241 U. S. 440 (1916).
12. E.g., Weiland v. Reorganized Catlin ConsoL Canal Co., 61 Colo. 125, 156 Pac.
596 (1916), cited infra note 17; see note 11, sitpra; Carpenter, Conflict of Jurisdiction
Respecting Control of Waters in Western States (1930) 2 Rocx, Mr. TL Ray. 162, 171;
cf. Zimmerman v. So Relle, 80 Fed. 417 (CC. A. 8th, 1S97) (conflict between two
suits to quiet title).
Furthermore, jurisdiction has been refused where the act sought to be enjoined would,
if committed, constitute contempt of a prior decree. United States v. Pedroli, 111 Fed.
14 (C. C. D. Nev. 1901); cf. Wade v. Clower, 94 Fla. 817, 114 So. 548 (1927). The
Montana statutes allow written complaint to be filed in the court issuing the decree if
there is dissatisfaction with the method of distribution. Moirr. REy. CoDEs im.
(Anderson & McFarland, 1935) §7150.
13. Penn Gen. Casualty Co. v. Pennsylvania, 294 U. S. 189 (1935).
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tides which accompanied traditional common law procedure often retarded
the development of potentially prosperous areas.14 Almost all of the western
states have consequently established statutory methods of adjudicating water
rights. Some plans provide -for almost complete administrative control;15
others retain judicial control with administrative assistance ;16 all aim, among
other things, at unity of control by determination of all rights to a particular
stream in one proceeding. 7 When states seek to improve their water ad-
ministrations by providing economidal and effective methods of settling water
right controversies, it seems inappropriate for the federal courts to inter-
fere by entertaining separate actions concerning water rights which have
already been adjudicated and are still being supervised by the state authori-
ties.18 Especially is this so where proper effectuation of decrees requires
constant administrative supervision 19 of a type which the federal courts
are not empowered to provide2
14. See Pacific Live Stock Co. v. Lewis, 241 U. S. 440, 448 (1916); Lasky, From
Prior Appropriation to Economic Distribution of Water bi the State-Via Irrigation
Administration (1929) 1 RocKY MT. L. Ray. 161, 248, .2 id. 35; Moht. Irr. Comm.,
Report to Governor, July, 1906, at 3; Ore. State Engineer, Special Report No. 1, The
Need of Water Legislation in Oregon, Dec., 1907; MEAD, IRRIGATION INSTITUTIONS
(1903) 350.
15. See, e.g., Ore. State Engineer, Bull. No. 2, The Oregon System of Water Titles,
April 15, 1912.
16. This is the case in Montana. Lasky, .upra note 14, 1 RocKY MT. L. REV. at
252, 260.
17. See Pacific Live Stock Co. v. Lewis, 241 U. S. 440, 448 (1916) ; Lasky, .sipra
note 14, 1 Rocarcy M. L. Rav. at 173. Colorado courts early held that to allow one
state district court to take jurisdiction after the entrance of a decree adjudicating water
rights by another would be contrary to the purpose of the water adjudication statutes.
Weiland v. Reorganized Catlin Consol. Canal Co., 61 Colo. 125, 156 Pac. 596 (1916).
But subsequent attempts to estiblish an exception to this rule confused the law on this
point. Compare Hazard v. Joseph W. Bowles Reservoir Co., 87 Colo. 364, 287 Pac.
854 (1930), with Faden v. Hubbell, 93 Colo. 358, 28 P. (2d) 247 (1933) ; see Whitcomb
v. Murphy, 94 Mont. 562, 565, 23 P. (2d) 980, 931 (1933).
18. It has been held an abuse of discretion for a federal court to assume jurisdiction
when a state has provided a statutory method of liquidating insurance companies.
Pennsylvania v. Williams, 294 U. S. 176 (1935); Gordon v. Washington, 295 U. S. 30
(1935); see Comment (1927) 41 HAnV. L. Rav. 70; cf. Kansas City Pipe Line Co. v.
Fidelity Title & Trust Co., 217 Fed. 187 (C. C. A. 8th, 1914) (no statutory scheme).
On discretionary jurisdiction generally see Comment (1936) 45 YALu L. J. 1235, 1242
ct seq. .
19. See Montezuma Canal Co. v. Smithville Canal Co., 218 U. S. 371, 384 (1910);
Carpenter, supra note 12, at 163, 169; Lasky, supra note 14, 1 Roc=y Mr. L. REV. at 249.
20. On the respective merits of state control and federal contrdl (under statutory
provision) see Carpenter, loc. cit. supra note 12.
RIGHrT OF NAMXED INSURED TO 1bECOVER FOR INJURY UNDER
OMNIUS CLAUSE*
THaE OWNER of an automobile was injured through the negligence of a
guest driver. An insurance policy bound the insurer to indemnify the
owner as named insured, and anyone resp'onsible for the operation of his
car with his permission,' "against loss by reason of the liability to pay
damages to others for bodily injuries" sustained through the operation of
the car, by any person other than those in certain excepted classes. The
injured owner brought action against the insurer on an unsatisfied judgment
against the guest driver, who was concededly protected by the omnibus
clause of the policy.2 The Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut held3
that the insurer had not contracted to indemnify the driver against liability
to the named insured, by virtue of the clause making it an indemnitor only
against liability "to others," words here read to mean not "others than the
persons responsible for a particular accident," but "other. than the named
insured." 4
Omnibus coverage clauses, now virtually standard in automobile liability
insurance policies,5 extend the protection of such policies to a defined group
*Cain v. American Policyholders Ins. Co., 120 Conn. 645, 183 At. 403 (1936).
1. The extraterritorial coverage endorsement, under which this suit was brought,
e.-tended this coverage to include "any person or persons while riding in or legally
operating" the motor vehicle, but did not change the effect of the wording of the
insuring clause.
2. Such an action is expressly authorized by Coeur. Gmr. STAT. (1930) §4231.
3. The Connecticut court in the instant case considered itself bound to interpret
the insurer's obligation as one defined by Massachusetts law, since the policy was
executed in Massachusetts by a Massachusetts company to a Massachusetts resident,
and in its -view the law of that state on the point was clearly indicated in a case
construing the clause in the Compulsory Motor Vehicle Liability Statute to which
the insuring clause in the present policy conformed. [MacBey v. Hartford Accident
& Indemnity Co., 197 N. E. 516 (Mass. 1935).] Although the insurer's liability in
the instant case was measured exclusively by the provisions of the extraterritorial
coverage indorsement which constituted a distinct policy, applicable to matters and
territory not covered by the policy to which it was attached (cf. Blair v. Travelers
Ins. Co., 197 N. E. 60 (Mass. 1935)], the decision of the Massachusetts court was
sufficient evidence of the construction it would have deemed proper. Two judges con-
curred on this ground alone,-while the majority interpreted the contract independently
to agree with what both groups considered the Massachusetts result. It is to be
noted, however, that the two cases may be distinguished on the ground that in the
Massachusetts case a statute was the object of inquiry, whereas in the presefit case
a standard insurance 'policy was involved, and different rules of construction are
applicable to each.
4. Cain v. American Policyholders Ins. Co., 120 Conn. 645, 183 At. 403 (1936).
5. See Blanchard, Compulsory Motor Vehicle Liabiily Insuranco in fassaclhutscli
(1936) 3 LAW AND CoNTraroRAsy PRoBLrus 537, 540.
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of persons0 in addition to the insured specifically named therein.' A member
of the group thus insured is directly protected by the policy," and the insurer's
liability to him is independent of any responsibility of the insurer to the
owner,9 and is not conditional on the existence of the owner's liability to
the injured person as principal for the negligent driver.10 Nor is the liability
of the insurer, apart from express exceptions, affected by the character of
the person to whom the assured becomes liable." It follows, then, that
recovery under such a policy should not be denied an injured claimant merely
because he would have been protected against liability by the same policy
had he negligently caused injury to others, instead of being himself injured
by the negligence of another assured. In general the courts follow this
reading, and determine the plaintiff's rights under the policy with reference
to the circumstances of the case at hand, without regard to what his rights
under the policy would be should a different situation arise.
12
6. Although the group defined varies with the policy, the omnibus clause is
customarily phrased to insure those responsible for the operation of the automobile
and those legally operating or riding in it, provided such use or operation is with the
consent of the named insured.
7. 5 Couca, INsURANcE (Supp. 1933) 66; Kup', C,\SUALTY INSURANcE (1928)
303; Legis. (1933) 8 Wis. L. Rav. 349, 350.
8. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Mann, 73 F. (2d) 465 (C. C.A.
4th, 1934) ; Fried v. London Guarantee & Accident Co., 136 Misc. 740, 242 N. Y. Supp.
60 (1930); Barsuk v. Independence Co., 142 Misc. 260, 254 N. Y. Supp. 352 (1931);
see Sauriolle v. O'Gorman; 86 N. H. 39, 48, 163 Atl. 717, 722 (1932); (1934)
3 BROOKLYN L. Rav. 343, 344. The omnibus clause often specifically provides that
the protection of the policy is made available to the additional assureds as if they
were named in the policy.
9. Century Indemnity Co. v. Norbut, 117 N. J. Eq. 584, 177 Atl. 248 (Ch. 1935).
10. Ocean Accident & Guaranty Co. v. Schmidt, 46 F. (2d) ?69 (C. C. A. 6th,
1931); Smith v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 109 W. Va. 280, 153 S.E.
584 (1930); cf. Brower v. Employers' Liability Assur. Co., 318 Pa. 440, 177 AtI. 826
(1935) ; RMcAR s ON INSuRANcE (1932) 893; 13-14 HuDDY, ENCYCLOPEDIA oF AUTO-
MOBILE LAW (1931) 406; (1935) 83 U. OF PA. L. Ray. 765.
11. Union Automobile Ins. Co. v. Samuelson, 71 Colo. 479, 207 Pac. 1113 (1922);
cf. Adams v. American Employers Ins. Co. of Boston, 198 N. E. 147 (Mass. 1935);
see Farmer v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 11 F. Supp. 542, 543 (M. D.
Ala. 1935).
12. Farmer v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 11 F. Supp. 542 (M. D.
Ala. 1935); Adams v. American Employers Ins. Co. of Boston, 198 N. E. 147 (Mass.
1935) ; Howe v. Howe, 87 N. H. 338, 179 AtI. 362 (1935) ; Archer v. General Casualty
Co. of Wis., 219 Wis. 100, 261 N. W. 9 (1935); Harrison v. United States Fidelity
& Guaranty Co., 255 Ill. App. 263 (1929) (proposition assumed); cf. Bachman v.
Independence Indemnity Co., 214 Cal. 529, 6 P. (2d) 943 (1931); Dickinson v. Mary-
land Casualty Co., 101 Conn. 369, 125 Atl. 866 (1924); see American Automobile
Ins. Co. v. Cone, 257 S.W. 961, 965, 966 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923); Note (1931)
72 A.L.R. 1375, 1384. Conira: Johnson v. Employers' Liability Assur. Corp., 158
Misc. 758, 285 N.Y. Supp. 574 (Sup. Ct. 1935); cf. MacBey v. Hartford Accident
& Indemnity Co., 197 N. E. 516 (Mass. 1935).
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The Connecticut° court apparently adopts the opposite iew, at least for
the named insured, in construing the phrase "to others" as expressly ex-
cepting any liability in damages to the named insured from the coverage.
of the policy. Such a restrictive interpretation seems inconsistent with
customary usage in expressing similar exceptions in insurance policies,'3
with the practical objectives of the particular policy here in issue lL and with
familiar canons of construction.' 5 Moreover, this court would hardly extend
its view of the policy to bar recovery to injured claimants who happened to
qualify as members of the insured group at the time of the accident.10 It
would therefore seem more reasonable and desirable to interpret the phrase
"to others" descriptively as indicating persons other than those incurring
liability and involing the protection of the policy in a given case,17 rather
than restrictively to exclude from the coverage of th.e policy in all cases
liability by one of the assureds to injured members of the defined group, or
to the named insured.
In the instant case, the court seemed persuaded by the proposition that
to allow a named insured to recover under the policy for his own injuries
would convert it into a contract of personal accident insurance, a result
13. Had it been intended to except injuries to the named insured from the coverage
of the policy, it is reasonable to suppose that the policy would have employed the
unequivocal terms used to exclude damages to the property of the named insured.
See Howe v. Howe, 87 N. H. 338, 179 At. 362, 364 (1935) (in this case the court
also indicates that it finds no distinction between the phrases "liability to others" and
"liability to any persons" as regards any intent to exclude liability to the named
insured from the coverage of the policy). The form of policy nov generally used
in most states specifically excepts from the coverage of the policy "bodily injury
to or death of any person who is a named insured." See Blanchard, Compulsory
Motor Vehicle Liability Insurance in Massachusetts (1936) 3 LAW .ND Cozn i o .nox
PRoLmr s 537, 541.
14. By the omnibus clause, the object of the policy is extended to indemnify the
members of the defined group as well as the owner of the car against loss through
liability to others. For this additional protection an additional premium has un-
doubtedly been paid. See Barsuk v. Independence Indemnity Co., 142 Misc. 260, 263,
254 N. Y. Supp. 352, 355 (Sup. Ct. 1931); also Dickinson v. Maryland Casualty Co.,
101 Conn. 369, 381, 125 Atl. 866, 370 (1924). See Stovall v. New York Indemnity Co.,
i57 Tenn. 301, 313, 8 S.W. (2d) 473, 476 (1928).
15. The rule is that ambiguous insurance policies are to be construed strictly
against the insurer so as to sustain the claim and cover the loss, if reasonably possible.
5 Coucr, I.suRAxcE (Supp. 1933) 67; VAnuc, I sUmAnC (1930) 691.
16. Adams v. American Employers Ins. Co. of Boston, 193 N. E. 147. (Mfass.
1935); Harrison v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 255 Ill. App. 263 (1929)
(proposition assumed); cf. Dicldnson v. Maryland Casualty Co., 101 Conn. 369, 12
At. 866 (1924); see American Automobile Ins. Co. v. Cone, 257 S. W. 961, 965, 965
(Te. Civ. App. 1923); Suimxmn, Auroaouz IssuRn c (1929) §930; Note
(1931) 72 A.L.R. 1375, 1384.
17. This construction also conforms to the meaning accorded the mooted phrase
in similar contexts throughout treatises and judicial opinions. Typical example:
,XcHAEDs oNr IxsupawcE (1932) 893.
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considered inconsistent with its form and object.18 But the analogy is mis-
leading, for personal accident insurance policies indemnify directly against
a loss suffered by the injured party who is insured, whereas the construc-
tion of the policy for which the plaintiff contended in the instant case would
inderinify the person whose negligence was considered at law to have caused
the injury against a liability to the injured claimant, who happened in this
case to be the owner of the car. The plaintiff does not claim as an insured
under the policy, but merely by virtue of a statute"0 which allows him to
recover from the insurer directly what it promised to pay to the person
incurring the liability to him. This statute subrogates the plaintiff to the
rights of the judgment-debtor-driver-indemnitee, and the present suit must
therefore be viewed as if the latter were seeking to recover the promised
indemnity for his liabilit3;; in such a case the analogy of a personal accident
insurance policy could hardly be accepted.
APPORTIONMENT BETWEEN LiFE TENANT AND REMAINDERMEI OF
STOCK ISSUED IN REORGANIZATION*
THE coRPuS of a trust, created in 1913 to pay the income to L and the
principal on his death to R, consisted in part of 200 shares of the Diamond
Match Company of Illinois, each share having an intact, or book value of
$90.67, the aggregate book value of the stock in the corpus being $18,134.
In 1930, when the book value of the same shares had increased to $180.22
each, the Illinois company sold All its assets to the newly organized Diamond
Match Company of Maryland, receiving in exchange all of the stock of
the Maryland company. Thereupon, the Illinois company sold all the Mar-
land stock to the Diamond Match company of Delaware, a newly organized
holding company, and received in exchange all the stock of the Delaware
company, which it then distributed to its stockholders. Finally the Illinois
company was dissolved and its stock cancelled. The trust estate, in exchange
for its 200 shares in the Illinois company, received 1,000 preferred and 800
common shares in the new Delaware holding company, having a book value
of $25 and $13.81 respectively, or an aggregate book value of $36,048. The
trustee held the new stock until the death of L in 1934 when, on an adjudi-
cation of the trust estate, the question of an apportionment between L and
R arose. The court decreed that the remainderman should be awarded as
corpus that proportion of the new stock which the intact value of the Illinois
stock at the creation of the trust ($18,134) bears to the book value of the
holding company stock received by the trustee in 1930 ($36,048), or 50.31%
of the new stock. The balance was held to represent an accumulation of
trust income to which L, the life tenant, was entitled.1
18. Cf. Johnson v. Employers' Liability Assur. Corp., 158 Misc. 758, 285 N.Y.
Supp. 574 (Sup. Ct. 1935), cited sipra note 12.
19. CONN. GEN. STAT. (1930) §4231.
*ln re Daily's Estate, 186 AtI. 754 (Pa. 1936).
1. Ibid.
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It is well settled that a life tenant cannot claim any part of a simple in-
crease in the value of the corpus,2 which belongs conceptually to the re-
mainderman as capital. Before apportionment of a gain between the life
tenant and the remaindermen will be decreed, there must be some action
either by the corporation in the form of a cash, stock, or liquidating dividend,
or by the trustee in the form of a sale of the trust assets3 -some transition
which will justify the court's attempt to separate the gain into income and
capital. Since the new holding company stock received by the trustee in
the principal case was not, strictly speaking, a dividend at all but rather a
substitution in the trust corpus, the court was required to determine, as a
preliminary question, whether the reorganization of the Illinois company
constituted a liquidation of the original company and a purchase of stock
in a different corporation with the proceeds or was merely a nominal change
in the form of the original investment.Y Although the proportional share
of each stockholder in the original physical assets of the Illinois company
was left undisturbed by the reorganization, there was a substantial change*
in the relationship of the stockholders to those assets. The Pennsylvania
court held that the "creation of a new corporation acting under the laws
of a different forum and with new rights and new interests," coupled with
the interposition of a holding company, worked "a complete change and
separation in the corporate shares."' ; Although the court was forced to
distinguish on tenuous grounds a recent case holding that a merger of
several companies did not effect a change in the nature of the trust invest-
ment in stock of one of the constituent companies,0 the decision in the prin-
cipal case seems inescapable. The physical assets of the Illinois corporation
are now held by a Maryland corporation with control vested in a Delaware
holding company. The beneficial owners have been removed one step from
the corporate property and have lost direct control. Their equities may be
seriously impaired by the imposition of prior liens on the operating corpora-
2. Gibbons v. Mahon, 136 U. S. 549 (1890); Anderson v. Bean, 272- Mss. 432,
172 N. E. 647 (1930) ; United States Trust Co. v. Heye, 224 N. Y. 242, 120 N. E. 645
(1918) ; Macy v. Ladd, 128 Misc. 732, 219 N. Y. Supp. 449 (1926) ; ]n re Nirdlinger's
Estate, 290 Pa. 457, 139 At!. 200 (1927) ; Connolly's Estate, 193 Pa. 137, 47 AUt. 1125
(1901); see Bryan v. AiMn, 10 Del. Ch. 446, 468, 86 At. 674, 634 (Sup. Ct. 1913):
Matter of Osborne, 209 N. Y. 450, 475, 103 N. . 723, 730 (1913) ; 4 Bournr, Truss
.AmN TRusTEES (1935) §324; 2 Pzany, TausTs wD Thus.ES (7th ed. 1929) §.546.
3. In re McKeown's Estate, 263 Pa. 73, 106 AtI. 1S9 (1919) ; In re Buist's Estate,
297 Pa. 537, 147 Atl. 606 (1929) ; 4 BooEzar, loc. cit. stpra note 2.
4. See rule expressed in In re Buist's Estate, 297 Pa. 537, 147 Atl. 605 (1929).
5. In re Daily's Estate, 186 At!. 754, 756 (Pa. 1936).
6. It re Buists Estate, 297 Pa. 537, 147 At!. 606 (1929). It is felt that the Buist
case should have been overruled rather than distinguished. In the case of both reorgan-
ization and merger there is a change in the legal relationship between the benefical
owner and the corporate property. The merger may iesult in very serious practical -
changes in the character of the investment by reason of the old stock's reduced voting
power in the new corporation and of the injection into the new corporation of additional
liabilities, new management and operating policy.
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tion's earnings; and the entire assets of that company may even be sold
or mortgaged without their consent.7
Since it viewed the reorganization as a liquidation of the trust corpus, the
court was required to divide the stock received as a liquidating dividend
between life tenant and remainderman. With respect to the distribution of
ordinary dividends 8 between life tenant and remainderman, American courts
have generally followed one of two well defined rules.0 The Pennsylvania
rule,' 0 in an effort to carry out what it considers to be more nearly the
testator's intent and to achieve an equitable result, apportions such dividends,
whether declared in cash or in stock, so that the intact value of the corpus
calculated as of the time of the creation of the trust is preserved."1 The
7. For a general treatment of the.effect on the rights and liabilities of stockholders
of corporate reorganizations, mergers; consolidations, dissolutions, etc., see 1 FLETCnEin,
CYcLOPiDIA CORoRTIoNs (Perm. ed. 1931) § 48; 15 id. c. 61, 62; 16 id. c. 65.
8. The term "ordinary dividend" is used herein to describe the regular or periodic
corporate distribution of earnings as distinguished from extraordinary and/or liquidat-
ing dividends. See 4 BOGERT, op. cit. supra note 2, § 844.
9. In any- jurisdiction, however, the expressed intent of the testator, wherever
ascertainable, will govern the distribution of the trust income. Gibbons v. Mahon,
136 U. S. 549 (1890); Union and New Haven Trust Co. v. Watrous, 109 Conn. 268,
146 Atl. 727 Z1929); Anderson v. Bean, 272 Mass. 432, 172 N. E. 647 (1930); United
States Trust Co. v. Heye, 224 N. Y. 242, 120 N. E. 645 (1918).
10.' 4 BooRT, op. cit. supra note 2, § 850 lists the following jurisdictions as adopting
the Pennsylvania rule: California, Delaware, Hawaii, Iowa, Indiana, New Jersey,
South Carolina, Tennessee, Vermont, and Wisconsin. See also 1 RESTATEMENT,
Tausrs (1935) §§ 235, 236.
11. Earp's Appeal, 28 Pa. 368 (1857); Matter of Osborne, 209 DN. Y. 450, 103
N. E. 723 (1913); In re Nirdlinger's Estate, 290 Pa. 457, 139 Atl. 200 (1927); In re
Graham's Estate, 296 Pa. 436, 146 At. 111 (1929) ; In re Bullitt's Estate, 308 Pa. 413,
162 At. 288 (1932); In re Waterhouse's Estate, 308 Pa. 422, 162 At]. 295 (1932);
In re Cassatt's Estate, 105 Pa. Super. 14, 158 Ati. 586 (1932). Courts applying the
Pennsylvania rule consider that income to the corporation should be income to the life
tenant regardless of the corporation's treatment of its income. In rc Nirdlinger's
Estate, supra. But capital gains from speculative market conditions, appreciation of
assets, increased earning power and good will are said to belong to the corpus. In re
Nirdlinger's Estate, supra; McCoy v. McCloskey, 94 N. J. Eq. 60, 117 At. 473 (Ch.
1922); 4 BOGERT, op. cit. supra note 2, § 824. In making the actual apportionment,
however, the courts say the essential thing is to find the book value of the stock in
the estate at the time of its creation and to apportion to the corpus only such amount
of future dividends as will maintain ,the original value. In re Stokes's Estate, 240
Pa. 288, 87 Atl. 975 (1913) ; In re Mallory's Estate, 285 Pa. 186, 131 Atl. 714 (1926) ;
In re Baird's Estate, 299 Pa. 39, 148 Atl. 907 (1930) ; In re Waterhouse's Estate, sapra;
In re Cassatt's Estate, supra. Since speculative market conditions, appreciation of
assets, and increased good will may be reflected in the book value, the application of
the Pennsylvania rule will not square with its theory unless the bookkeeping and
financial practice of the corporation for the period under consideration is minutely
analyzed, and capital increases are segregated to the account of the corpus.
The Pennsylvania rule will not require an apportionment unless some segregation
of income or earnings has occurred. Supra, notes 2 and 3. On the other band, and
NOTES
-Massachusetts rule' arbitrarily awards all cash dividends to the life tenant
and all stock dividends to the corpus.'5 These differences are carried over
into the field of liquidating dividends, or distribution of assets upon dis-
solution of the corporation.' 4 Courts adhering to the Pennsylvania rule look
into the corporate records to apportion to the life tenant that portion of
the liquidation payment which is traceable to accumulated net earnings,
preserving for the remainderman the value of the original corpus intact.15
But in Massachusetts rule jurisdictions dividends in liquidation are con-
sidered capital and are awarded to the corpus.' By" treating retained earn-
ings as capital,17 the Massachusetts rule has the virtue of being easy to
administer, and makes the life tenant's income entirely conditional on the
dividend policy of the corporation whose stocks are held in the corpus.' 8
Although under the Pennsylvania rule an apportionment is clearly required
where, as in the principal case, a reorganization is held to constitute a sale
of the trust property, the prudence of such action may be questioned. The
extreme difficulty of analyzing the past history of the corporation's trans-
actions, coupled with the trustee's interest in avoiding personal liability for
a mistaken calculation requires, in each doubtful case, resort to the-courts
for judicial interpretation, with attendant delay and expense to the trust
illogically, it will decree an apportionment on as slight a segregation as the declaration
of a stock dividend which, in its ultimate analysis, effects no more of a change in the
corporate position than an adjusting bookkeeping entry from surplus to capital
12. 4 BoGEnr, op. cit. .tpra note 2, § 851 lists the following jurisdictions as adopting
the Massachusetts rule; United States Supreme Court, Connecticut, District of Colum-
bia, Illihois, Maine, Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska, Ohio, Rhode Island, Virginia, and
West Virginia. Statutes of Connecticut, Georgia, New York and Oregon have enacted
the Massachusetts rule. CorN. GEN. STAT. (1930) § 4966; GA. CODE (1933) §85-605;
N. Y. PEsoNA PRopEmRy LAw § 17-a; ORE. CODE Awn. (Supp. 1935) §63-1205.
THE UirioRu PrINcIPAL AND INCO dE Acr § 5 has accepted the Mfassachusetts rule.
13. Minot v. Paine, 99 Mass. 101 (1S68) ; Buder v. Franz, 27 F. (2d) 101 (C. C. A.
8th, 1928) ; Spooner v. Phillips, 62 Conn. 62, 24 Ati. 524 (1892) ; Union and New Haven
Trust Co. v. Taintor, 85 Conn. 452, 83 Ad. 697 (1912); Billings v. Warren, 216 IIl.
281, 74 N. E. 1050 (1905); D'Ooge v. Leeds, 176 Mass. 558, 57 N. E. 1025 (1900);
Anderson v. Bean, 272 Mass. 432, 172 N. E. 647 (1930).
14. 4 BOGEnT, op. cit. upra note 2, § 855.
15. In re Schaeffer, 222 N. Y. 533, 118 N. E. 1076 (1917); In re McKeown's
Estate, 263 Pa. 78, 106 At. 189 (1919); It re Nirdlinger's Estate, 290 Pa. 457, 139
AUt. 200 (1927).
16. Gifford v. Thompson, 115 Mass. 478 (1874); Brownell v. Anthony, 1S9 Mass.
442, 75 N. E. 746 (1905); Anderson v. Bean, 272 Mass. 432, 172 N. E. 647 (1930).
17. Wilberding v. Miller, 88 Ohio St. 609, 106 N. F. 665 (1913), supplementary
opinion, 90 Ohio St. 28, 106 N. E. 665 (1914); see Gray v. Hemmenvay, 263 Mass.
515, 168 N. E. 102 (1929).
18. 4 Boo~rr, op. cit. sipra note 2, § 857. Under the Massachusetts rule the life
tenant usually obtains the benefit of an increased income through the reinvestment of
the property by the corporation, if a stock dividend, or by the trustee of a liquidating
dividend. In the principal case the trust income from the corporate investment in-
creased from an average of $1800 per year before the reorganization to $-2300 per year
thereafter. Record, pp. 7a-9a, In re Daily's Estate, 186 At]. 754 (Pa. 1936).
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administration. Further, it would seem that factors other than an identifi-
cation of undistributed earnings should be considered to obtain an equitable
apportionment. It may be that the stock in the corpus is sufficient to give
the trust estate a controlling voice in the corporate management and where
this is so, an apportionment of a stock dividend might well operate to divest
the estate of such control. Furthermore, since in the ordinary course of
events the life tenant has been receiving the customary proportion of the
corporate earnings for the duration of the trust through the medium of
,periodical dividends, it seems highly fictitious to assume that the testator
intended that all earnings during the life of the life tenant accrue to him,
including undistributed profits which become available for distribution only
on the dissolution of the corporation, and then can be identified only after
a difficult analysis of the corporation's books.1 0 It seems just as reasonable
to contend, on the issue of the settlor's intention, that the structure of the
trust contemplates a division of the rewards of stockholding between the
life tenant, who is to receive the income ordinarily paid over to the stock-
holder as dividends, and 'the remainderman, who takes the entire equity
of the stock, including surplus accumulated out of undistributed profits.
19. Gibbons v. Mahon, 136 U. S. 549 (1890) sctable.
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